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Introduction: A City Divided 
Early into my Junior year studying at Trinity College, I was sitting in my car 
waiting to turn onto Brownell Avenue, along the East gates of Trinity’s campus, to park 
at my off-campus house.  It was around 4:00 in the afternoon and that meant one thing: 
lots and lots of school buses.  The street that I lived on was directly across from the 
Learning Corridor, a collection of Interdistrict magnet schools that are a key component 
to efforts in Hartford to desegregate the school system.  As I sat in my car waiting for 
the buses to pass, I noticed that each bus was labelled with the name of a different 
town.  Individual buses had pieces of paper that designated where the students would 
be going home to: West Hartford, Hartford, Glastonbury, Avon, and elsewhere.  I 
immediately noticed also that not only were the buses divided by the towns the students 
lived in, but they buses also filled with students that all looked like each other.  Each 
individual bus was comprised of similar looking students but they all looked different 
from the one before them.  One bus would pass by with an overwhelming majority of 
African-American students.  Another would pass with the same majority of white 
students.  I was unnerved seeing the segregation of the children on these buses.  It was 
in that moment that I first began to contemplate how many children and their families in 
Hartford, and in most cities and towns across America, live in deeply segregated 
neighborhoods.  It seemed that each town would only be home to people who all looked 
just like each other. 
This is the story of the landmark school desegregation case in Hartford, 
Connecticut, ​Milo Sheff et. al., v. William A. O’Neill et. al ​.  In 1996, Hartford’s schools 
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were found by the Supreme Court of the state to be segregated, and this remains true 
for many Hartford schoolchildren now in 2019.  The case is important, because the 1
programs that have evolved in the decades after have worked towards the goal of 
integration in Hartford, and can teach us what is effective and what is not in integrating 
schools.  Chapter one of this thesis will unpack some of the history of how Hartford and 
its neighboring suburbs maintained segregation within the region throughout the 20th 
century.  It will also argue that these efforts were integral in maintaining school 
segregation decades after it had been deemed illegal, because the structures that 
enforced segregation were never truly dismantled.  While segregated residential areas 
were nothing new in the 1900s, many efforts throughout the century upheld and 
reinforced that segregation, digging the city deeper into its enforcement of the practice. 
Residents of Hartford and its neighboring suburbs lived in distinctly segregated spaces 
by the time the plaintiffs in the ​Sheff​ case filed their original complaint in 1989.  The 
complaint charged that the state was in violation of its constitution by failing to provide 
schoolchildren an education in an integrated setting.  As a result of this violation and the 
fact that children were sent to schools in the districts they lived in, the schools of the 
region were heavily segregated by race, class, and ethnicity.   Chapter one will explain 2
how this process occurred over time, and what systems, institutions, and historical 
actors played a role in leading to the conditions confronted in the ​Sheff ​case.  By 
connecting the residential segregation in Hartford with the segregation in the city’s 
1 "Hartford Public Schools: Striving for Equity through Interdistrict Programs," The Century Foundation, 
October 14, 2016. 
2 Milo Sheff et al. v. William A O'Neill et al. (July 9, 1996). 
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schools, an understanding of the historical context that led to the ​Sheff​ case provides 
insight into the trial and the years that have followed. 
Chapter two will discuss the time between the 1989 original complaint throughout 
the trial and decision in 1996 in favor of the plaintiffs.  The chapter will provide some 
insight into the arguments made by either side in the trial, which leads to a better 
understanding of the differences in how members of the community, as well as city and 
state officials, viewed the problems that were being presented in this case.  After the 
decision was announced, how these wrongs would be corrected was unclear.   The 3
second chapter will argue that this singular court decision was not enough to compel 
legislators to enact meaningful change in the face of public opinion that opposed 
mandatory integration in favor of market-based reforms 
Chapter three will focus on the more than two decades since the 1996 decision 
by laying out the various settlements and stipulations that were agreed upon throughout 
many continuations of ​Sheff ​to set new goals and benchmarks for desegregating 
Hartford’s schools.  The chapter will once again call attention to the arguments that 
showcase how different actors in this case viewed the problem and its solutions.  In 
addition, I will propose the reasons why many of these goals were not met, as well as 
how the court attempted to mediate between the two sides.  By studying the 
desegregation programs and efforts that were taken up to solve this issue, a better 
understanding can be reached of what worked, what didn’t work, and how Hartford’s 
schools ended up the way that they are in 2019.  
3 Jack Dougherty, Christina Ramsay, and Jesse Wanzer, "Sheff v. O'Neill: Weak Desegregation 
Remedies and Strong Disincentives in Connecticut, 1996-2008," ​Trinity College Digital Repository​, 2009. 
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Chapter four of this thesis presents an argument that ties the previous three 
chapters together for an analysis of what went right and what went wrong in the 23 
years following the 1996 decision.  The chapter will unpack the ​Sheff​ saga as it has 
unfolded so far, and analyze why the efforts that have been undertaken were the way 
they are, how they have been and have not been effective in achieving the goals set 
forth in 1996 and beyond.  This chapter will offer an answer to the question of why many 
of the ​Sheff​ goals were never reached, and why many of Hartford’s public schools 
remain segregated in 2019, despite efforts dating back to 1996 to solve this problem.  I 
will argue that political pressure from white suburban families shaped the types of 
programs undertaken. These programs were not sufficient in addressing the depth of 
the problems that caused and maintained school segregation in Hartford, and the root 
cause of school segregation, neighborhood segregation, was never addressed in the 
solutions.  In addition, I will show that a lack of directive towards ensuring quality in 
integrated schools has been a shortcoming in giving all Hartford public schoolchildren 
an equitable education, not just an integrated one.   ​Milo Sheff, et al., v. William O’Neill 
is an important court case not only for Hartford, but for the nation as a whole.  An 
opportunity for a brighter future for Hartford’s children stands before the state, and since 
the 1980s, it remains on trial. 
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Where You Live is Where You Learn: How We Got Here 
In 1989, a group of Hartford Public School students led by fourth-grader Milo 
Sheff filed a lawsuit that challenged racial segregation in the district's schools.   The 4
plaintiffs brought forward a complaint that detailed the discrepancies in the racial 
composition between Hartford’s public schools with their majority-minority school 
populations and those of the surrounding school districts that were majority white. Sheff 
and the other plaintiffs pointed to the State of Connecticut’s knowledge of school 
segregation in Hartford, and accused the state of being complicit in this problem for 
failing to act to remedy the disparities.   They pointed to The Connecticut State 5
Constitution, which guarantees both a free public education to all Connecticut children, 
and a guarantee that no person can be denied “equal protection of the law nor be 
subjected to segregation or discrimination,” as the reason that Connecticut was required 
to act.   Seven years later, in​ Sheff v. O’Neill ​ the Connecticut State Supreme Court 6
decided in favor of the plaintiffs by declaring that Hartford schools indeed were 
segregated by race, and that the State of Connecticut held responsibility for this 
problem.  In the Court’s ruling, the justices stated that Sheff and his fellow students had 
been denied the right to an “equal educational opportunity” as was guaranteed to them 
by the State Constitution.   The Court was clear about how this segregation had 7
happened.  The decision pointed to a districting statute from the year 1909 that 
assigned children to the public school district they reside in and asserted it was “the 
4 Milo Sheff, et al., v. William O’Neill - Plaintiffs' Complaint (Hartford Superior Court April 26, 1989). 
5 Ibid 
6 Constitution of The State of Connecticut, State of Connecticut (1965). 
7 Milo Sheff et al. v. William A O'Neill et al. (July 9, 1996). 
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single most important factor contributing to the present concentration of racial and 
ethnic minorities in the Hartford public school system.”   This one comment illustrates 8
the ways in which residential segregation in the Hartford region influenced racial 
segregation in Hartford’s schools.  An understanding of how Hartford’s neighborhoods 
became segregated should be considered crucial contextual information that sets the 
scene for the state of school segregation leading up to the ​Sheff​ decision in the 1990’s 
and the more than twenty-years of attempting to achieve racial integration in Hartford’s 
schools that has followed.  
The State of Connecticut played a key role in the creation and maintenance of 
the residential segregation that came to shape the imbalance in the schools and then 
failed to rectify segregation that they knew existed in Hartford.  As early as the mid-19th 
century, black residents of Hartford faced discrimination and rising rent prices that 
forced them out of areas such as the South End, and into areas that still are deeply 
segregated such as the North End.  In the early 20th century, as black migration into 
Hartford increased, housing discrimination continued as a powerful force shaping 
Hartford’s neighborhoods.   In 1933, as part of the New Deal, the Home Owners’ Loan 9
Corporation was created in order to rescue private homeowners who were going to 
default on their homes.  The Great Depression had been devastating for working and 
middle class families, and had created a massive housing crisis in which many 
homeowners were faced with foreclosure.  The HOLC was created by the Roosevelt 
8 Milo Sheff et al. v. William A O'Neill et al. (July 9, 1996). 
9 Susan E. Eaton, ​The Children in Room E4: American Education on Trial ​ (Chapel Hill, NC: Algonquin 
Books of Chapel Hill, 2009). 
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Administration to address the crisis.   The purpose of the HOLC was to buy existing 10
mortgages that were facing “imminent foreclosure.”   These new mortgages had 11
repayment schedules that reached fifteen years and eventually extended to twenty-five 
years.  Prior to this New Deal program, working and middle class urban families 
struggled to afford repayment plans that often offered only five to seven year repayment 
schedules  This deal was offered to homeowners across the country, and in all cases, 
the HOLC offered this help based on its own assessment of the risk of any borrower 
making the obligated regular payments in any property in a specific neighborhood.  The 
HOLC evaluated risk by considering the property and its surrounding neighborhood to 
determine whether the property would retain its value.  Using the process of redlining, 
the HOLC color coded maps of metropolitan areas, labeling the neighborhoods that they 
deemed most risky for loans in red. Local real estate agents were hired to draw the 
boundaries for these maps, but the National Association of Real Estate’s code of ethics 
directed agents to “never be instrumental in introducing into a neighborhood...members 
of any race or nationality...whose presence will clearly be detrimental to property values 
in that neighborhood,” leading local agents to follow the national policy of maintaining 
segregation by drawing discriminatory redlined maps in their cities.   In towns that had 12
high populations of minorities, regardless of the economic status of the area, many of 
these neighborhoods were given a risky designation.  Hartford was no exception to the 13
HOLC’s racist redlining practices.  In a study of 1937 appraisal reports by the HOLC in 
10 Richard Rothstein, ​The Color of Law: A Forgotten History of How Our Government Segregated America 
(New York: Liveright Publishing Corporation, a Division of W. W. Norton & Company, 2017). 
11 Ibid 
12 Ibid 
13 Ibid 
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Hartford’s neighborhoods, it is made clear that there was a deliberate effort to deny 
loans to homeowners in majority-minority neighborhoods.  One neighborhood, 
designated with the label “D-2,” was considered a ‘red’ district, which brought with it the 
highest determined level of risk.  The population of neighborhood D-2 was described as 
100% “foreign-born,” and the explanation for the highest-risk status it had been 
assigned was the “character of neighborhood and inhabitant.”   The reports described 14
that the characteristics of a risky neighborhood were based on the presence of an 
“undesirable population.”   In contrast to this, the least-risky districts were described as 15
being “homogenous.”   Even all black neighborhoods, which technically were 16
homogenous, were still given risky assessments, regardless of the quality of the 
neighborhood itself.  17
One neighborhood in Hartford, designated as “D-1,” was also labelled in red. 
The report of this neighborhood listed the population as being “66% Negro,” and 
described the area as having “gradually drifted into a Slum area now mainly occupied 
by Negros.”   The comment that the area had become a slum was not based on the 18
quality of buildings in the neighborhood, but rather was used as a racialized tool that 
highlights the perceptions of black people as being of a lower class and character than 
whites.  A report by the Federal Housing Administration from 1948, a separate 
organization from the HOLC that was formed in 1934 for the purpose of insuring bank 
14 Ibid 
15 Ibid 
16 Ibid 
17 Ibid 
18 "Federal HOLC "Redlining" Map, Hartford Area, 1937," 2012, University of Connecticut Libraries Map 
and Geographic Information Center - MAGIC. 
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mortgages, claimed that allowing black people to enter a neighborhood would lead to a 
decline in property values and the quality of a neighborhood.  
 
 
 
The HOLC report on Neighborhood “D-1” from 1937.  Describes populations as being “Italian” 19
and “Negro.”  Says under “detrimental influences” that the area is a “slum.” 
19 Ibid 
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 ​Figure shows a redlined map of Hartford and West Hartford from 1937.  The two red zones are the 20
“D-1” and “D-2” neighborhoods that are deemed most risky.  The green zones are designated least risky, 
followed by blue, and then yellow. 
20 Jack Dougherty and contributors, ​On the Line: How Schooling, Housing, and Civil Rights Shaped 
Hartford and Its Suburbs​ (Trinity College, book-in-progress, 2018) 
Bloom, 12 
 ​The HOLC report on Neighborhood “D-1” from 1937.  Describes the area as a “slum” that is “occupied 21
by Negros.” 
 
To convince white homeowners that their neighborhoods were declining in value and 
quality, therefore becoming slums, prospectors used racialized tactics that portrayed 
towns populated by black people as lower in quality.  In some cases, black women were 
hired to walk through white neighborhoods with their babies in strollers and black men 
were paid to drive through white neighborhoods blazing music from their radios.  Even 
the suggestion that a white neighborhood was becoming inhabited by racial minorities 
was enough to convince white homeowners that their neighborhoods were deteriorating, 
illustrating how the concept of what was considered a slum was often based on race.   22
These reports highlight how government policy was driven by an effort to 
maintain neighborhood segregation in Hartford and around the country.  It becomes 
21 Ibid 
22 Richard Rothstein, ​The Color of Law: A Forgotten History of How Our Government Segregated America 
(New York: Liveright Publishing Corporation, a Division of W. W. Norton & Company, 2017). 
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apparent that government policy, such as the HOLC’s redlining policies, played an 
influential role in forming and intensifying the residential segregation that became 
standard in Hartford and many metropolitan areas around the nation.  The Federal 
Housing Administration, which was a separate entity from the HOLC, issued statements 
and guidelines, for use by everything from federal agencies to local real estate agents, 
that highlighted the federal government’s dedication to maintaining residential 
segregation.  The federal guidelines issued by the FHA trickled down from the federal 
level to the state level, and were used to encourage residential segregation throughout 
the country, including in Hartford, through practices such as redlining.  In a manual from 
1935, the FHA instructed that “if a neighborhood is to retain stability it is necessary that 
properties shall continue to be occupied by the same social and racial classes.  A 
change in social or racial occupancy generally leads to instability and a reduction in 
values.”   Particularly worrisome was the FHA’s concern with what residential 23
integration would mean for education.  If children, the FHA manual reads, “are 
compelled to attend school where the majority or a considerable number of the pupils 
represent a far lower level of society or an incompatible racial element,” such 
neighborhoods “will prove far less stable and desirable than if this condition did not 
exist.”   This statement shows the government's investment in racist policies that 24
ensured that mortgage lending would be undesirable in integrated neighborhoods. 
Another practice that perpetuated residential segregation in Hartford was the use 
of racially restrictive housing covenants, private clauses in housing deeds that generally 
23 Ibid 
24 Ibid 
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prohibited non-white families from living in certain homes and neighborhoods.  In 1926, 
the Supreme Court ruled that these racial clauses were private agreements, and were 
not illegal as they were not the result of state actions.   in 1948, the Supreme Court 25
shifted slightly.  The government could not enforce these restrictions, the court ruled, 
although they were still considered to be valid private agreements.   In other words, the 26
new position of the government was that the use of restrictive covenants was still legal, 
but that they could not be enforced judicially.  These racially restrictive covenants were 
used to create exclusionary housing in Hartford, as well as in other cities around the 
nation.  A study of restrictive covenants in West Hartford in the 1940’s shows the effect 
that this system had on intensifying the already existing residential segregation in the 
Sheff​ region by restricting neighborhoods, landlords, and homeowners from engaging in 
integration efforts.  One example of these covenants appearing in Hartford is the 
development of High Ledge Homes, a land development in West Hartford under the 
direction of Edward Hammel.   Hammel’s development included a racially restrictive 27
covenant.  “No persons of any race,” the housing deeds in High Ledge Homes read, 
“other than the white race shall use or occupy any building or any lot.”   28
 
25 Ibid 
26 Ibid 
27 Jack Dougherty and contributors, ​On the Line: How Schooling, Housing, and Civil Rights Shaped 
Hartford and Its Suburbs​ (Trinity College, book-in-progress, 2018) 
28 "Race Restrictive Covenants in Property Deeds, Hartford Area, circa 1940.," University of Connecticut 
Libraries Map and Geographic Information Center - MAGIC, 2012. 
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 ​The property deed from High Ledge Homes in 1940 29
 
 
 
 
 Racially restrictive language from an original High Ledge Homes property deed in 1940.  30
 
 
A study conducted in 2012 by the University of Connecticut's Libraries Map and 
Geographic Information Center of housing deeds in West Hartford from the 1940s found 
the exact same racially restrictive language and wording as was seen in the High Ledge 
Homes development throughout the ​Sheff​ region.   In 1940, the population of the 31
neighborhood where High Ledge Homes was built was 100% white.  It remained this 
29 Ibid 
30 Ibid 
31 Ibid 
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way until 1980, when the white population dropped only to 98%.   By the time of the 32
Sheff​ case in the 1990’s, the white population of this historically segregated 
neighborhood remained at 93%, with 3% of the population being Hispanic, and 1% 
being black.  Despite the practice of racially restrictive covenants being made illegal 
later in the 20th century, the area remained segregated as few efforts were made, either 
by the federal, state, or local governments, as well as by private actors, to remedy the 
past wrongs and dismantle the systems and institutions that created the segregated 
conditions in the first place.  Not only did Hammel’s development explicitly exclude 
non-white residents, but the rhetoric used in the advertisements from the properties 
reflected federal policy and general white attitudes on segregated neighborhoods during 
the 1930’s and 1940’s.  One advertisement, from the opening of High Ledge Homes in 
the 1940’s, claims that the area is a “thriving community,” in which homeowners would 
“like your neighbors.”   The scholar Richard Rothstein argues that restrictive covenants 33
were reliant upon “collaboration” between private actors and the federal judicial system.
  Through these covenants, and through other structures such as redlining, Hartford 34
and its surrounding neighborhoods actively resisted integration, creating the conditions 
for neighborhoods such as the High Ledge Homes area to remain 100% white.  35
Practices that worked to keep minorities out of white communities did not end 
after the 1940’s.  Despite a 1974 report by the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights that 
32 "Racial Change in the Hartford Region, 1900-2010," University of Connecticut Libraries Map and 
Geographic Information Center - MAGIC, 2012. 
33 Jack Dougherty and contributors, ​On the Line: How Schooling, Housing, and Civil Rights Shaped 
Hartford and Its Suburbs​ (Trinity College, book-in-progress, 2018) 
34 Richard Rothstein, ​The Color of Law: A Forgotten History of How Our Government Segregated America 
(New York: Liveright Publishing Corporation, a Division of W. W. Norton & Company, 2017). 
35 http://magic.lib.uconn.edu/otl/timeslider_racethematic.html 
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found that banks in the Hartford region continued to show bias towards minorities who 
were searching for mortgages, the ability of black families to move into predominantly 
white neighborhoods was technically protected by law by the end of the 1960s.  In 1968, 
Congress passed the Fair Housing Act, which prohibited “discrimination in the sale, 
rental, and financing of dwellings.”   While the Fair Housing Act was the formal platform 36
of the federal government, the judicial system failed in many cases to actively  prevent 
the continuation of housing segregation practices.  In 1977, a study was conducted in 
Hartford by the organization Education/Insturcción that attempted to uncover denials of 
homeowners’ insurance to homes in majority-minority neighborhoods in the city. 
Properties in the predominantly minority North End neighborhood were highly likely to 
be denied insurance.  At the same time, South End and West Hartford properties, which 
had higher populations of white residents, were more likely to be approved for 
insurance.  The practice of insurance redlining, which appears in this study, is a threat 
to “equal housing opportunities,” the “revival of declining neighborhoods,” and it 
threatens homeowners’ “need for reasonable and adequate homeowners insurance for 
a mortgage closing.”    Twenty three out of thirty six properties in the study were denied 37
insurance.  Only one of the properties that was denied insurance was not located in the 
North End.   In one conversation with an insurance agent about a property in the North 38
End, the agent stated that he could not approve the property for homeowners’ insurance 
36 Susan E. Eaton, ​The Children in Room E4: American Education on Trial ​ (Chapel Hill, NC: Algonquin 
Books of Chapel Hill, 2009). 
37 Education/Instruccion, "Fair Housing At Its Worst: Insurance Redlining, Report 10," ​Trinity College 
Digital Repository​: , 1978. 
38 Ibid 
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“simply because of the location.”  A similar property in the same neighborhood was 39
denied insurance, despite the agent declaring that the property was in “good condition.” 
“That,” referring to the location of the property, “is it in a nutshell,” the agent said.   The 40
language used by the agent makes it clear that the variable that he is basing his denial 
on is the location of the property, which is a reflection of the racial and socioeconomic 
character of the neighborhood, not property quality.  One striking conversation from the 
study was an outright admission of discriminatory practice by another insurance agent, 
who openly admitted that “we can’t give you a homeowners’ policy on it because the 
companies don’t allow homeowners’ policies in those areas.  It is kind of discriminatory, 
course I never said that, but that is the way that works.”   Of the thirteen insurance 41
agents who denied insurance policies solely based on location of a property in the North 
End in this particular study, nine offered policies to “identical” homes in the South End 
or West Hartford, where the populations were predominantly white.   It seems that 42
these policies of racial discrimination were so widely unchallenged by the government, 
despite a Connecticut court case only a few years prior in 1974, which led to 
settlements by financial institutions, that made it apparent to the public and the 
government that discriminatory housing practices were continuing in Connecticut.  43
Despite being illegal under the Fair Housing Act of 1968, which outlawed discrimination 
39 Ibid 
40 Ibid 
41 Ibid 
42 Ibid 
43 Savahna Reuben, "Education/Instrucción Combats Housing Discrimination," Connecticut History | a 
CTHumanities Project, December 1, 2014. 
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based on race by financial institutions in providing financial services for a home, these 
practices have been used to reproduce residential segregation in Hartford.   44
The minority demographics in Hartford and its surrounding suburbs paint a clear 
picture of the exclusion that formed over the 20th century.  From 1900 to 1920, black 
migration from the Southern United States to Hartford tripled, reaching a population of 
4,119 African Americans in Hartford by 1920.  By the year 1941, 80 percent of African 
Americans living in Hartford were confined to a 40-square-block area known as the 
North End.   A 1956 ​Hartford Courant ​report claimed that in Hartford, ‘the Negro 45
population is concentrated in one general area...the north end,” where blacks are forced 
to live if they want “to work in Hartford.  He must rent his room or buy his house in the 
North End because there is no place else to go.”   After the Fair Housing Act had been 46
passed in 1968, some middle class black families were able to move into Blue Hills, a 
predominantly white area of Hartford.  With the passage of the Fair Housing Act in 
1968, it became illegal to discriminate in “the sale, rental, and financing of dwellings” 
based on race, which would have technically allowed black families to move into areas 
such as Blue Hills.  Despite this, a U.S. Commission on Civil Rights in 1974 found that 
banks in Hartford “remained biased against minorities...looking for mortgages,” which 
shows that despite the appearance of some demographic shifts, it was still a struggle for 
black families to integrate into white neighborhoods.  Soon after, the demographics of 
Blue Hills “tipped,” as white home owners, in reaction to “the black influx, sold their 
44 Fair Housing Act, § Sec. 804.[42 U.S.C. 3604] (1968). 
45 Susan E. Eaton, ​The Children in Room E4: American Education on Trial ​ (Chapel Hill, NC: Algonquin 
Books of Chapel Hill, 2009). 
46 Ibid 
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houses and moved out.”  Investigators, such as the ones from the Education/Insturcción 
group that studied insurance discrimination in Hartford, would confirm that Blue Hill 
‘tipping’ was the result of real estate agents steering blacks into the community, and 
steering whites out, into suburbs such as Glastonbury, South Windsor, and Simsbury.   47
By the beginning of the 1960s, 6,000 Puerto Ricans had moved into Hartford, 
predominantly settling in areas such as the North End.  A 1976 interview with the then 
mayor of West Hartford, Ellsworth Grant, shows the extent of discriminatory rhetoric 
against the integration of these Puerto Rican migrants.  Puerto Ricans, Grant said, 
“should remain in the core city or go back where they came from.  They don’t belong 
here.  I think West Hartford - the Hartford area - has been a port of entry too long for 
these types of people.”   By 1990, after decades of economic struggles in Puerto Rico 48
that led to many migrants leaving the island, 38,000 Puerto Ricans made up 27 percent 
of Hartford’s population.   By the time of the ​Sheff​ case, 93% of students in Hartford’s 49
schools were either Latino or black, compared to the predominantly white surrounding 
suburbs, as a result of the practices that confined black and Puerto Rican people to 
Urban Hartford, and the lack of any form of clear remedy to fix the segregation that 
existed after discriminatory practices became illegal.    As demographics of minority 50
and white populations shifted in Hartford during the 20th century, practices such as 
redlining, restrictive covenants, and blockbusting resulted in the dense concentration of 
black and Puerto Rican people in areas such as the North End. 
47 Ibid 
48 Ibid 
49 Ibid 
50 Ibid 
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 ​ A map of racial composition in Hartford in 1940.  Darker shaded areas are more heavily African 51
American and Hispanic neighborhoods.  African American populations can be observed living, for the 
most part, in the same neighborhoods in the Northern part of Hartford. 
 
  ​This map from 1960 shows the furthering of the segregation of minorities into neighborhoods in and 52
around the North End in Hartford into the second half of the 20th century. 
51 "Racial Change in the Hartford Region, 1900-2010," University of Connecticut Libraries Map and 
Geographic Information Center - MAGIC, 2012. 
52 Ibid 
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                    53
This map from 1980 shows that, despite practices such as redlining becoming technically illegal, African 
Americans and Hispanics continued to live in segregated neighborhoods, specifically the North End, where 
the population was around 90% African American at the time 
 
                   
  This map is from 2000, where every area in and directly around the North End has no white population 54
that surpasses 2%.  Coming just a few years after the initial ​Sheff​ case in 1996, this map highlights the 
residential segregation that lasted and flourished throughout the 20th century, and entrenched Hartford in 
segregation during that time. 
53 Ibid 
54 Ibid 
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As teacher Susan Eaton claims in her book, ​The Children in Room E4​, “ ​Sheff 
challenged those school district boundary lines, which lawyers argued,” acted to 
separate “the middle class from poor children, and white children from black and Latino 
children.  The lawyers in the ​Sheff​ case pointed to school district boundaries that 
separated suburban towns from Hartford, “corralling” minority students into separate 
schools that had unequal resources and offered lesser opportunities than suburban 
schools.   These inequalities that appear in segregated schools highlight why 55
segregated schools are detrimental to children.  As local property taxes provide much of 
the funding for schools, areas with high poverty such as Hartford find themselves 
lacking in the resources they need to support their students’ academic achievement and 
growth.  In addition, high school graduation rates for students in segregated 
metropolitan schools are lower than those of students in integrated schools.   As a 56
result of the 1965 U.S. Civil Rights commission that documented the racially segregated 
schools in Hartford, and as a result of an investigation by consultants from Harvard, 
Project Concern was developed in 1966 as an early attempt to address the segregation 
problem in Hartford’s public schools.  
 
 
 
 
55 Susan E. Eaton, ​The Children in Room E4: American Education on Trial ​ (Chapel Hill, NC: Algonquin 
Books of Chapel Hill, 2009). 
56 ​Lincoln Quillian, "Does Segregation Create Winners and Losers? Residential Segregation and 
Inequality in Educational Attainment," ​Social Problems​ 61, no. 3 (2014):. 
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 ​A map from 1966 of busing in the Hartford Region in the early days of the Project Concern 57
desegregation program. 
57 "Sheff v. O'Neill Settlements Target Educational Segregation In Hartford," Connecticut History | a 
CTHumanities Project, April 7, 2016. 
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Project Concern was a small program that allowed for certain Hartford students 
to be able to attend schools in the suburbs.  Project Concern was created out of the 
finding that segregated schools threatened the “life opportunities” of minority students.  58
Under the program, children from the city of Hartford were bused to neighboring school 
districts to attend school outside of their neighborhood.  The program become popular, 
as its wait list by 1970 had reached several thousand students.  Despite this, there was 
no effort made to expand the program beyond 1,500 students, which made up a mere 
2.5 percent of Hartford’s nearly 30,000 students.   Parents of suburban students in 59
neighborhoods that bused in students from Hartford reported mixed feelings about the 
program, citing concerns about the effectiveness of the program, whether or not 
education should take place in a student’s actual neighborhood, and concerns that their 
local schools were already overcrowded.  This shows how towns that had even had 
successful years under Project Concern had parents with attitudes that remained 
divisive about the continuation of the program.   Project Concern was not being 60
expanded upon in a way that would allow it to have a meaningful effect that could 
impact the other 97.5 percent of Hartford students who remained in the city’s public 
schools.  Minimal efforts were made by the city to integrate the schools by the end of 
the 1970s. 
Residential segregation in Hartford has a long history that has been influenced 
by Federal, State, and Local government actions, as well as the actions of insurance 
58 Susan E. Eaton, ​The Children in Room E4: American Education on Trial ​ (Chapel Hill, NC: Algonquin 
Books of Chapel Hill, 2009). 
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60 Thomas W. Mahan, ​Project Concern - 1966-1968; A Report on the Effectiveness of Suburban School 
Placement for Inner-City Youth ​, report (Hartford Public Schools). 
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companies, private owners, and developers.  Practices such as redlining and the use of 
racially restrictive covenants in housing deeds were used to corral minority populations 
into areas separate from white people. As black and Puerto Rican populations began to 
settle in Hartford throughout the 20th century, government policies and private practices 
sought to separate these groups from the white population that already lived in Hartford 
and its surrounding districts.  As many of the explicit ‘de jure’ practices that came to 
define the first half of the century began to fade away with the passage of civil rights 
laws, many players in the region continued to find subtle and hidden ways to continue to 
maintain neighborhood segregation in Hartford throughout the second half of the 
century.  This legacy of residential segregation has had lasting impacts on the 
segregation in Hartford’s public schools, as students mostly attend schools in the 
segregated neighborhoods in which they lived in, leading to disparities in achievement, 
resources, and opportunities.  The correlation between housing and educational 
segregation can be observed through the disparities that existed between white and 
minority populations based on where they live and where they learn by the time the 
Connecticut Supreme Court argued ​Sheff​ ​v. O’Neill ​ at the turn of the century.  The ​Sheff 
case was an important step, as it began to address the segregation of Hartford’s 
schools that was, in large part, the result of a long history of policies and practices that 
segregated residents in the ​Sheff​ region.  Despite the decision in favor of the ​Sheff 
plaintiffs, there still remains a lingering problem of segregation in Hartford’s public 
schools today.  The more than two decades after ​Sheff​ was first brought to court, a wide 
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array of programs have been put into place, but the problem of residential segregation 
has and continues to pose a challenge to achieving that goal. 
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Segregation On Trial 
“This is the case of a dream deferred,” proclaimed the civil rights lawyer who 
headed the ​Sheff ​legal team, John Brittain, on the opening day of the trial in December 
of 1992.   “What happens to a dream deferred? Does it dry up like a raisin in the sun?” 61
asked Brittain in his opening statement, quoting a famous poem by the African 
American poet Langston Hughes.   ​Milo Sheff, et al., v. William O’Neill ​, commonly 62
referred to as ​Sheff v. O’Neill ​, was brought to court by 19 Hartford public school 
students.  They sued the State of Connecticut on the basis that the segregation in their 
schools was failing to give them the “equal educational opportunity” that all children in 
Connecticut are guaranteed by the State’s constitution.   To understand how the 63
programs that Hartford used following the 1996 decision were shaped the by the trial 
itself it is necessary to take a deeper look at how the case was argued and decided. 
The case first originated in 1989, when the plaintiffs filed a complaint detailing the 
deeply entrenched racial, ethnic, and class segregation in Hartford’s public schools. 
91% of the students in these schools were black or Hispanic, and nearly half came from 
families living in poverty.   In contrast to the city of Hartford, the surrounding suburbs 64
were “virtually all-white,” and composed of “middle or upper-class” students.   In 65
addition to arguing for the educational opportunities of the minority students living in the 
city of Hartford, the complaint also pointed to those students living in the nearby 
61 Susan E. Eaton, ​The Children in Room E4: American Education on Trial ​ (Chapel Hill, NC: Algonquin 
Books of Chapel Hill, 2009). 
62 Ibid 
63 Milo Sheff, et al., v. William O’Neill - Plaintiffs' Complaint (Hartford Superior Court April 26, 1989). 
64 Ibid 
65 Ibid 
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suburbs, and claimed that they were being “deprived of the opportunity to associate 
with, and learn from, the minority children” attending Hartford’s public schools.   By 66
1989, when the ​Sheff​ case first began, Hartford’s schools were intensely segregated 
following centuries of housing discrimination in the city of Hartford.  
The 1987 annual report issued by the State’s Department of Education under the 
leadership of Gerald Tirozzi detailed the depth of the segregation in Hartford’s schools. 
“A trend is developing in Connecticut’s public schools that is causing, according to the 
dictionary definition of segregation, the ‘isolation of the races’ with ‘divided educational 
facilities,’” the report began.   The Tirozzi Report outlined “two Connecticuts,” one 67
which was affluent and white, and one which was poor, black and Hispanic, and was 
“shut out” of the “state’s economic and educational opportunities.”   The report 68
recommended that Connecticut should take “collective responsibility” for desegregating 
Connecticut’s schools, by dividing the state into new parts which would be used to 
“reduce racial isolation.”   69
The Tirozzi Report was met with mixed reactions throughout the state.  In 1988, 
the ​New York Times​ reported many of these reactions to Tirozzi’s suggestions and the 
future of integration in an article titled ​Racial Report on Schools: The Fallout​.  A 
Republican State Senator from Cheshire, Phillip Robertson, called for Tirozzi’s 
resignation, and called him “out of line...the Department of Education is responsible for 
66 Ibid 
67 Susan E. Eaton, ​The Children in Room E4: American Education on Trial ​ (Chapel Hill, NC: Algonquin 
Books of Chapel Hill, 2009). 
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reading and writing and teaching youngsters arithmetic.”   State Senator Thomas Scott 70
of Milford urged Connecticut citizens to oppose Tirozzi’s suggestions, arguing that “if 
anyone in the department, or the state board, suggests we’re not talking about forced 
busing, they are being dishonest with the people of Connecticut.”   This reference to a 71
mandatory desegregation plan highlights​ ​public opinion at the time, which greatly 
influenced the voluntary programs that were instilled after the decision. ​ ​Naomi Cohen, 
a State Representative from Bloomfield, represented Democratic hesitations about 
mandatory integration as well.  “If you read the report carefully,” said Cohen, “it never 
mentions busing, it says if the voluntary programs don’t work, the state can provide 
mandatory measures, but we’re a long way from that.”  72
Members of the public also spoke about the Tirozzi Report.  Some, like a man 
named Hal Whitney from Newington, wrote letters to the State Department.  Whitney 
wrote, “My wife and I work hard to realize the goals we've set for our family and I don't 
intend to have those goals changed by an ill-conceived, obsolete rehash of 1960's type 
liberalism.' '  On the other side of public opinion, people were also making their voices 73
heard in advocacy of integration.  Ralph Wallace, the principle of a Hartford middle 
school, wrote “just a short not today that ‘in the trenches’ your integration plan is 
receiving solid support.”   Cesar Batalla was the president of the Puerto Rican Coalition 74
based in Bridgeport, and he spoke about the Tirozzi Report, claiming “the situation in 
Connecticut’s schools is similar to the apartheid situation in South Africa, if you look at 
70 Charlotte Libov, "Racial Report on Schools: The Fallout," ​The New York Times​, January 31, 1988. 
71 Ibid  
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the difference between Bridgeport, and, say, Westport.”  Opinions about the Tirozzi 
Report reflect the high emotions that public officials and citizens felt when discussing 
desegregating schools.  Some feared what would happen if children were forced into 
mandatory programs like busing, and if suburban parents would lose complete control 
of their school districts.  This fear had a strong influence on the types of programs that 
would be employed and committed to for more than two decades after the 1996 
decision.  Even some of those who supported the sentiments in the report showed a 
lack of support for a decisive and mandatory court order to integrate schools.  With 
those in power not in support of mandatory integration, the ​Sheff​ case would be forced 
to focus on voluntary integration. 
The lawyers for the ​Sheff ​team, who spearheaded the search, found a committed 
group of plaintiffs from the ​Sheff ​region’s public school population who would help them 
represent the human side of this problem.  Elizabeth Horton Sheff was a nurse and 
mother of two, including her son Milo Sheff, who would become the lead plaintiff. 
Elizabeth Sheff also attended high school in Hartford.  Milo Sheff was ten years old 
when his mother first met with the lawyers who were attempting to take on Hartford’s 
segregation problem.  He was enrolled in Hartford’s Annie Fisher School as a fourth 
grader.  His mother, Elizabeth, was an ideal choice to lead the plaintiffs.  She grew up in 
an integrated neighborhood which had shaped her belief in the “transformative power” 
of “diversity and empathy.”  75
75 Ibid 
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 Elizabeth and Milo Sheff in 1996 after the Connecticut Supreme Court’s final ruling on the ​Sheff ​case. 76
 
The 19 plaintiffs who would come together to create the ​Sheff ​team’s group of 
lawyers and plaintiff's, were composed of black, Puerto Rican, and white children.  They 
included children who lived below the poverty line, children who had limited proficiency 
in English, and children who lived in single-parent families.   It was a diverse group, but 77
76 Matthew Kauffman, "Top-10 Courant Stories Of 2017 No. 10: Hartford Students Left Behind As Sheff 
Integration Efforts Falter," ​Hartford Courant​, December 22, 2017. 
77 Milo Sheff, et al., v. William O’Neill - Plaintiffs' Complaint (Hartford Superior Court April 26, 1989). 
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a group united by the unequal educational system that Hartford and its relationship with 
the surrounding region presented them.  These 19 families agreed to sue the state of 
Connecticut based on the racial and class segregation that was “enabled and sustained 
by state-enforced school district boundary lines,” and which “denied them the equal 
educational opportunity guaranteed by Connecticut's constitution.”   The defendants 78
named by the ​Sheff ​team were the governor of Connecticut, William O’Neill, Gerald 
Tirozzi, and several other state officials.   The lawyers argued that the de facto 79
segregation that caused the segregation in Hartford’s schools (although as Chapter One 
argued, much of this segregation was the result of de jure state actions) was harming 
the students in the city.  Brittain, speaking to audiences in Connecticut about this 
problem, argued that “De facto has come to translate, incorrectly, as meaning ‘no one’s 
fault.’”   He was making an important point, that the institutions and systems that built 80
and enforced segregation had not been dismantled after segregation had been made 
illegal.  As a result, de facto segregation was partly a result of the state’s actions that 
had created the systemic problem.  The plaintiffs table was filled with lawyers, including 
John Brittain and Wes Horton.  On the opposing side, the defendants were represented 
by assistant attorneys general for the state, John Whelan and Martha Watts.   The 81
case was to be heard by Judge Harry Hammer, set to determine whether the ​Sheff 
team would be able to tackle the ‘monster’ of segregation. 
78 Susan E. Eaton, ​The Children in Room E4: American Education on Trial ​ (Chapel Hill, NC: Algonquin 
Books of Chapel Hill, 2009). 
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81 Milo Sheff et al. v. William A O'Neill et al. (July 9, 1996). 
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“Nineteen children...filed this lawsuit...because the school district boundary lines 
have created a minority enclave of disadvantage in virtually every measurable category 
of education,” Brittain asserted Judge Hammer, “Black school[s]...in the city of Hartford 
and white school[s]...in the surrounding suburbs is to education what the South 
African...homelands are to South African apartheid.”   Hartford’s schools, due to the 82
concentrated poverty in the city, were “overburdened” and failed to “provide a minimally 
adequate education to students.”   83
 The 1989 complaint detailed the depth of the segregation that Brittain was trying 
to showcase.  “Although blacks comprise only 12.1% of Connecticut’s school-age 
population, and Hispanics only 8.5%” according to the plaintiffs, “these groups 
comprised, as of 1987-88, 44.9%” each of the school-age population of the Hartford 
school district.   This was compared to surrounding suburbs, where the minority 84
populations were smaller, as can be seen in the figure above.  Only 15.7% of West 
Hartford students were black or Hispanic, Glastonbury had a 5.4% minority school 
population, and Avon had a 3.8% minority school population, for example.   In the city 85
of Hartford, 47.6% of students were on Federal Aid to Families with Dependent 
Children, 40.9% had limited proficiency in English, and just over half lived in a 
single-parent family.   ​Sheff​ was meant to challenge these disparities that were 86
82 Susan E. Eaton, ​The Children in Room E4: American Education on Trial ​ (Chapel Hill, NC: Algonquin 
Books of Chapel Hill, 2009). 
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“separating the middle class from poor children, and white children from black and 
Latino children.”  87
 
 Text from 1989 Complaint detailing plaintiff’s assessment of minority student populations in Hartford’s 88
schools and schools of the surrounding suburbs. 
87 Susan E. Eaton, ​The Children in Room E4: American Education on Trial ​ (Chapel Hill, NC: Algonquin 
Books of Chapel Hill, 2009). 
88 Milo Sheff, et al., v. William O’Neill - Plaintiffs' Complaint (Hartford Superior Court April 26, 1989). 
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John Brittain and Wes Horton argued in front of Judge Hammer that school 
district boundaries that separated suburbs from the city of Hartford “corralled poor black 
and brown kids into a handful” of schools, which they contended were “overburdened… 
offering no exposure to the powerful social networks, unwritten rules, expectations, 
academic rigor and opportunities that every kid in mainstream America experienced.”  89
This argument that they put forth on the opening day of the trial echoed the sentiment in 
the original school desegregation case, ​Brown v. Board of Education​, in which the 
United States Supreme Court established that separate educational systems resulted in 
inequity between the two groups.  The precedent that had been set in ​Brown ​was 
echoed in the original complaint issued by the ​Sheff ​plaintiffs when they wrote that 
“separate educational systems for minority and non-minority students are inherently 
unequal,” and that this was the true in the Hartford public school system.   The 90
important clarification to make between the ​Brown ​case and ​Sheff​ is that ​Brown ​ never 
discussed the issue of de facto segregation.  ​Brown ​ was about ending legal 
segregation, while ​Sheff​ focused on taking on de facto segregation, and challenging the 
idea that it was not the result of state efforts.  Despite this difference, the principals in 
Brown ​of equity in integrated integration highlight the importance of the ​Sheff​ case. 
The ​Sheff​ legal team’s argument case rested on the fact that segregation was a 
violation of the state of Connecticut’s constitution.  “Equal educational opportunity,” read 
the 1989 plaintiff’s complaint, “is not a matter of sovereign grace, to be given or withheld 
at the discretion of the Legislative or the Executive branch.  Under Connecticut’s 
89 Ibid 
90 Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (May 17, 1954). 
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Constitution, it is a solemn pledge, a covenant renewed in every generation between 
the people of the State and their children.”   Article 2 of the State constitution states 91
that “no person shall be denied the equal protection of the law nor be subjected to 
segregation or discrimination in the exercise or enjoyment of his civil or political rights 
because of religion, race, color, ancestry, or national origin.”   92
 
 ​Hartford Courant, ​December 17, 1992 93
 
Another key component of the ​Sheff ​legal team’s case insisted that the state of 
Connecticut had knowledge of the state of segregation in Hartford’s schools for a long 
time prior to the case, but had failed to act to solve the problem.  The 1989 complaint 
91 Milo Sheff, et al., v. William O’Neill - Plaintiffs' Complaint (Hartford Superior Court April 26, 1989). 
92 Constitution of The State of Connecticut, State of Connecticut (1965). 
93 "School System Likened To Apartheid," ​Hartford Courant​, December 17, 1992. 
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outlined the ways in which “the defendants and their predecessors...have recognized 
the lasting harm inflicted on poor and minority students...yet, despite their knowledge, 
despite their constitutional and statutory obligations...the defendants have failed to act 
effectively to provide equal educational opportunity to the plaintiffs and other Hartford 
schoolchildren.”   The plaintiffs pointed to various moments in the state’s history in 94
which action could have been taken in response to revelations about school segregation 
that the state had been made aware of.  In 1965, for example, the Hartford Board of 
Education, along with the City Council, hired consultants from Harvard’s school of 
education to observe their school system to report on the segregation in the school 
system.  The consultants found students were achieving below their potential in a way 
that correlated with “a high level of poverty among the student population,” that 
segregation in the schools was damaging to minority children, and most importantly to 
Brittain and Horton’s case, the report suggested “that a plan should be adopted, with 
substantial redistricting and Interdistrict transfers funded by the State, to place poor and 
minority children in suburban schools.”   95
City officials responded the this report by developing Project Concern in Hartford, 
a busing program between the city itself and its neighboring suburbs and towns, but the 
program failed to reach more than 1,500 students, only a mere 2.5% of Hartford’s 
30,000 student population, most likely as a result of a lack of commitment by the state 
and city, as well as the voluntary nature of the integration plan.   Two years later, in 96
94 Milo Sheff, et al., v. William O’Neill - Plaintiffs' Complaint (Hartford Superior Court April 26, 1989). 
95 Milo Sheff, et al., v. William O’Neill - Plaintiffs' Complaint (Hartford Superior Court April 26, 1989). 
96 Susan E. Eaton, ​The Children in Room E4: American Education on Trial ​ (Chapel Hill, NC: Algonquin 
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1968, the Civil Rights Commission supported legislation in the Connecticut Legislature 
which would allow state bonds to be used to “fund the construction of racially integrated, 
urban/suburban ‘educational parks’ which would be located at the edge of metropolitan 
school districts, have had superior academic facilities, have employed the resources of 
local universities, and have been designed to attract school children from urban and 
suburban districts.”   Despite the state and city’s knowledge of these issues and 97
proposed solutions, they unfortunately ignored them.  Although the proposed legislation, 
along with the Harvard consultant’s propositions, would have fulfilled the state’s 
constitutional duty to prevent segregation in its schools, the legislation was not passed. 
In the same year as the failed legislation in the state Legislature, the State Board 
proposed another bill that would have “authorized the Board to cut off State funding for 
school districts that failed to develop acceptable plans for correcting racial imbalance in 
local schools.”   Despite being given another chance to fulfill its constitutional 98
obligation, the state again elected not to enact the legislation.  The ​Sheff ​legal team 
cited the state’s historical failures to act on its obligations, despite knowledge of the 
problem, to argue that the state had failed in its duty to prevent segregation in Hartford’s 
schools and that it must be required to act by the courts.  A defining theme that would 
result from the ​Sheff ​solutions is that lack of any directive that addressed the history of 
residential segregation in Hartford, and the widespread public opposition to redistricting 
that influenced the policy solutions. 
97 Milo Sheff, et al., v. William O’Neill - Plaintiffs' Complaint (Hartford Superior Court April 26, 1989). 
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Another major strategy outlined the consequences that segregation had on the 
education and future of students in segregated schools.  They correctly claimed that the 
achievement of Hartford school children lagged behind the educational progress of 
students in neighboring towns, as was evidenced by test scores compared between 
Hartford and its neighbors.  “These disparities in achievement,” they insisted, “are not 
the result of native inability: poor and minority children have the potential to become 
well-educated, as do any other children.”   They concluded that the State, in allowing 99
segregated school districts to continue, “had deprived the plaintiffs and other Hartford 
children of their rights to equal educational opportunity, and to a minimally adequate 
education - rights to which they are entitled under the Connecticut Constitution.”  100
They pointed at the “far greater proportion” of at risk students in Hartford’s schools that 
place “Hartford public schools at a severe educational disadvantage in comparison with 
the suburban schools.”   To prove their point about these consequences of 101
segregation, Brittain and Horton brought an education professor from Michigan State 
University, Mary Kennedy, to testify about her studies on school segregation.  “Poor 
children in high-poverty schools,” her research documented, “performed far worse than 
similar poor children who attended schools without a high poverty rate.”   Despite this 102
truth, they proclaimed that “because the Hartford public schools have an extraordinary 
proportion of at-risk students among their student populations, they operate at a severe 
educational disadvantage,” which places “enormous educational burdens on the 
99 Milo Sheff, et al., v. William O’Neill - Plaintiffs' Complaint (Hartford Superior Court April 26, 1989). 
100 Ibid 
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individual students, teachers, classrooms, and on the schools,” in the heavily 
segregated school system.   103
The plaintiffs cited statistics from the required statewide Mastery Tests as proof 
of their claims.  Hartford students performed worse on these tests than students from 
nearby suburbs.  In 1988, for example, “34% of all suburban sixth graders scored at or 
above the master benchmark for reading, yet only 4% of Hartford school children meet 
that standard.”   Similarly, three-fourths of suburban students exceeded the “remedial 104
benchmark” for reading schools, while only 41% of Hartford students met the standard 
of “essential grade-level skills.”   In addition to achievement on State tests, the 105
plaintiffs also pointed to higher numbers of dropouts in Hartford’s schools, lower 
numbers of graduates who attended four-year colleges, and fewer employed full-time 
within nine months of graduation, compared to suburban schools.   This burden and its 106
results, they argued, “deprived both the at-risk children and all other Hartford 
schoolchildren of their right to an equal educational opportunity,” as was guaranteed to 
them by the State’s constitution.   Despite the arguments posed by the plaintiff's 107
showing the importance of quality schooling, none of the remedies that resulted from 
the ​Sheff​ decision set any relevant goals towards ensuring high-quality education in 
integrated schools. 
Brittain and Horton brought Jomills Braddock, a sociologist from the University of 
Miami, to further demonstrate the point of disadvantage in segregated settings.  He 
103 Milo Sheff, et al., v. William O’Neill - Plaintiffs' Complaint (Hartford Superior Court April 26, 1989). 
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described the “social inertia and...avoidance tendency among individuals and among 
subgroups to maintain their isolation and separation.  They anticipate hostilities that 
may or may not be real.  They develop an aversion or a fear of mixed group interactions 
because they have not had prior experience with those kinds of contacts to develop a 
comfort level.”   Braddock’s testimony detailed how desegregation “can break down 108
barriers to access to fair career opportunities,” in that “integrated settings afford 
minorities the personal contacts and information networks that connect anyone to 
opportunities.”   Braddock’s research highlighted the plaintiff’s argument that 109
segregation in Hartford’s schools was placing its students at a disadvantage that would 
follow them through their whole lives.  His research even showed that employers 
favored hiring minority students who had attended suburban schools, and that minority 
students had much higher chances of getting jobs, and higher paid jobs, when they had 
access to “racially integrated social networks,” than minority candidates who “used 
segregated black social networks.”  110
One of the witnesses called by the plaintiffs was Edna Negron, former principal at 
Betances Elementary School in Hartford.  She was asked to testify about the depth of 
the segregation in her school. Edna Negron had spoken out many times before about 
conditions in her school.  In 1993 she said “There are two Connecticuts, one white, 
wealthy, and suburban, one poor, minority, and urban...I have a school that is 100 
108 Susan E. Eaton, ​The Children in Room E4: American Education on Trial ​ (Chapel Hill, NC: Algonquin 
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percent minority, where all the children but a handful are poor.”   Negron went on to 111
say that she has children in her school “who need tremendous amounts if special 
attention,” and that they “are not going to get it in this setting because there are simply 
too many of them.”   Edna Negron brought her experiences to help further the 112
argument in favor of the plaintiffs​.​  The principal of Hartford’s McDonough Elementary 
school, Don Carso, testified in court that he didn’t “believe the youngsters (in his school) 
can aspire to something that they don’t have any knowledge of.  They can’t really 
conceive of a different kind of life than what they see all around them.”   113
This defense directly challenged the constitutional obligation argument that 
Brittain and Horton’s case rested upon.  In contrast to the stream of various educators, 
professionals, and scholars that that the plaintiffs had called to the stand, the state’s 
defense brought Lloyd Calvert, a retired superintendent of West Hartford’s schools, to 
testify in their favor.  Calvert had only visited 6 of the 33 schools in Hartford, and none 
of them were middle schools or high schools.  He’d gathered much of his information 
from “documents and brochures” that administrators had provided for him, and he 
hadn’t taken any notes during his visits.   Despite the lack of depth to his investigation 114
into Hartford’s schools, Calvert testified in favor of the defense that “the problem was 
not the schools...but the children’s poverty, which kept them from using all the 
opportunities,” that were afforded to Connecticut's children.   The problem with Calvert 115
111 Laurel Waters, "Students Sue Connecticut Over Integration Issues," ​The Monitor​ (Hartford), November 
2, 1993. 
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not visiting a reasonable amount of Hartford Public Schools is that he was unable to 
gain a full understanding of the schools, and therefore could not make an informed 
statement about what the specific problem actually was.  While poverty was indeed an 
important factor in holding back many of Hartford’s schoolchildren, this fact should not 
be used to mask the quality issues within the schools.  This defense attempted to 
deflect responsibility from the state’s constitutional obligation by deflecting blame.  The 
claims brought by the witnesses for the plaintiff's about the conditions of Hartford’s 
public schools refute these claims by the defense.  The defendants pushed the blame 
for the schools’ segregation problems off of the State, and onto individual choices of the 
community, which they claimed categorized the problem as de facto.  John Whelan, 
defending Connecticut in court, opened his case bluntly, “there is no past or present 
segregation to undo, the court will have no evidence to wrongdoing on the part of the 
state,” he claimed.   Since Connecticut had not caused the segregation in its schools, 116
segregation could not be blamed on the state itself, and that the State did not have a 
responsibility to address the problem.  Whelan argued that segregation could only be 
considered unconstitutional, if “state officials would have had to knowingly and willfully 
construct it in the first place.”  117
The 72-page document that was Judge Hammer’s decision soon arrived in the 
hands of Horton and Brittain, and to their surprise, they had lost.  “This is a very narrow, 
technical ruling,” Brittain was reported as saying the ​New York Times​ on April 13, 1995, 
“The judge did not at all deal with the distressed educational conditions in Hartford.  So 
116 Ibid 
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we will once more test the question of whether de facto segregation is unconstitutional.”
  Despite the loss, Horton saw a way that the case could be brought back to life, and 118
the decision reversed.  Hammer’s decision did conclude that the “single most important 
factor” contributing to the segregation in Hartford was a 1909 statute that divided school 
districts based on town boundaries.   This finding by Judge Hammer, Horton and 119
Brittain believed, could justify their claim that the state of Connecticut helped cause and 
maintain segregation, and therefore, did hold responsibility for the segregation in 
Hartford’s schools.  
That appeal brought the case to the Connecticut Supreme Court in 1995. 
Opening with the conclusion from Hammer’s decision about the 1909 statute, Horton 
began, “There’s a cause, because of the districting statutes and if it weren’t for that, 
then this would not be happening. ​ The statute reads: “Each town shall through its board 
of education maintain the control of all the public schools within its limits and for this 
purpose shall be a school district and shall have all the powers and duties of school 
districts.”   Chief Justice Ellen Peters then questioned one of the new members of the 120
defense team, Richard Blumenthal.  She wondered whether a child in Hartford could 
“just walk over to West Hartford and attend that school,” if they wanted to.  121
Blumenthal explained that this was not an option that was afforded to Hartford students, 
because legally suburban schools were not obligated to educate a child from the city of 
Hartford.  Justice Berdon pointed out that this showed that the district lines, as created 
118 George Judson, "Connecticut Wins School Bias Suit," ​The New York Times​, April 13, 1995. 
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by the state, were the cause of the problem, saying that this was not intentional, “but 
that (the district lines) caused this separation.”   The theme of what obligation 122
suburban districts have in aiding integration, and how much of the burden would be 
placed on the city of Hartford, would appear consistently throughout negotiations for 
remedies. 
Three years after the ​Sheff​ trial had begun, in July 1996, the verdict was finally 
delivered.  The ​Sheff​ plaintiffs had won.  Chief Justice Ellen Peters wrote in the final 
decision, “Students in Hartford suffer daily from the devastating effects that racial and 
ethnic isolation, as well as poverty, have had on their education.  The principal issue in 
this appeal was whether the State, which already plays an active role in managing 
public schools, must take further measures to relieve the severe handicaps that burden 
these children’s education.”   The vote ended up being decided 4 to 3, with Peters, 123
Berdon, Norcott, and Katz siding with the plaintiffs, and Justices Bordon, Callahab, and 
Palmer dissenting in favor of the state.   Justice Peters’ majority opinion found that the 124
State held responsibility for the “de facto” segregation, and that the State “perpetuated” 
the segregation between Hartford and suburban schools while failing to take action to 
support the schoolchildren of the region.   The opinion concluded that the State had 125
failed “to provide the plaintiffs with an equal opportunity to a free public education as 
required by article first, ​§§ 1 and 20, and article eighth, § 1, because the defendants 
have maintained in Hartford a public school district that...is severely educationally 
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disadvantaged; fails to provide equal educational opportunities for Hartford 
schoolchildren; and fails to provide a minimally adequate education for Hartford 
schoolchildren.”   126
Her decision placed blame on the State of Connecticut’s role in the segregated 
state of Hartford’s public schools, linking it to the 1909 districting statute was an 
important assertion.  She agreed with Hammer that this statute is “the single most 
important factor” causing the segregation in the schools.   In striking down the 127
defense’s claims to dismiss the role of the State in the present segregation, Peters’ 
wrote “In summary, under our law, which imposes an affirmative constitutional obligation 
on the legislature to provide a substantially equal educational opportunity for all public 
schoolchildren, the state action doctrine is not a defense to the plaintiffs’ claims of 
constitutional deprivation.”   As she explained, segregation’s de facto nature was 128
irrelevant as segregation was prohibited “without specifying the manner in which such a 
causal relationship must be established,” according to the State constitution.   As the 129
districting statute caused segregation by race, the state has an obligation to override the 
rule because following it denied Hartford’s schoolchildren a constitutionally mandated 
equal education.  Unfortunately, public pressure would stand in the way of addressing 
this statute directly in the ​Sheff​ integration programs. 
The Connecticut Supreme Court’s decision in the ​Sheff​ case in 1996 demanded 
reform and reckoning with the inequalities that existed in Hartford’s segregated schools. 
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“We do not wish to be misunderstood about the urgency of finding an appropriate 
remedy for the plight of Hartford’s public schoolchildren.  Every passing day denies 
these children their constitutional right to a substantially equal educational opportunity,” 
wrote Justice Peters.   She pointed to the roadblocks to learning and educational 130
achievement that segregated schools placed on Hartford’s schoolchildren.  The majority 
decision emphasized the statistics about the poor academic achievement of Hartford’s 
students who were largely failing to meet the State’s educational goals.  Peters asked 
that the other branches of Connecticut’s government act to remedy the segregated state 
of Hartford’s schools, and find the proper solutions that would allow Hartford’s children 
to prosper.  “It is crucial for a democratic society to provide all of its schoolchildren with 
fair access to an unsegregated education,” wrote Peters, “As the United States 
Supreme Court has eloquently observed, a sound education ‘is the very foundation of 
good citizenship.’”   Yet while the 1996 Connecticut Supreme Court Decision in ​Sheff 131
v. O’Neill ​appeared to be a success for desegregation efforts in Hartford, a long road lay 
ahead to achieve tangible results that John Brittain, Wes Horton, and Elizabeth Sheff 
hoped to see in the Hartford community.  The 1996 opinion would be the first of many 
stipulations and orders by the court that would follow in the next two decades in 
attempts to meet the goal of integration that seemed to be within reach at the time. 
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An Uphill Battle: Two Decades of Agency and Resistance 
The 1996 Connecticut Supreme Court Decision in ​Sheff v. O’Neill ​ was an 
important ruling in the legal history of school desegregation in Hartford.  While the 
decision upheld the Plaintiffs’ argument that segregation in Hartford’s schools was a 
violation of the Connecticut State constitution, a court ruling in itself was not enough to 
create change.  In order to actually achieve the results that the Plaintiffs were hoping 
for, a concrete plan that addressed residential segregation in the region, established 
that suburban districts would be required to participate fully, and invested in the quality 
of integrated schools.  Discussions began between the State and City governments, 
school systems, and ​Sheff ​plaintiffs and lawyers about what methods would be utilized. 
Different groups disagreed over what type of desegregation program would be fair and 
effective.  Both the Republican governor and the mostly-Democratic state legislature 
(mainly coming from the suburbs) agreed soon after the decision that a mandatory 
program, such as mandatory busing, would not be used to integrate Hartford’s schools.
  Instead, Governor Rowland created Rowland’s Educational Improvement Panel in 132
1996 to create a voluntary integration plan for the ​Sheff​ region.  The panel sought to 
represent the needs of all parties involved, including both Hartford and suburban 
schoolchildren, but only one of the panel’s members, Eddie Davis, the school 
superintendent from Manchester, was a parent of a child in a Hartford school.”   In 133
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1997 the Improvement Panel submitted its report to the Connecticut General Assembly, 
and the legislature passed their proposal.  
Soon after, the governor signed An Act Enhancing Educational Choices and 
Opportunities into law.  The bill had two main strategies: the expansion of Project 
Concern into a new program called ‘Open Choice,” or “Project Choice,” and the 
expansion and creation of new Interdistrict magnet schools that would draw students 
from all over the ​Sheff​ region.  Both of these solutions relied on voluntary action taken 
by parents and students, something that would prove to create a challenge in achieving 
the goals set forward in the following two decades.   The new Project Choice program, 134
formulated to reflect a free-market and choice based system, allowed Hartford students 
to transfer into suburban schools whenever officials in the suburbs said that they had 
available seats for these Hartford students.  In addition, grants were made to create and 
expand charter and Interdistrict magnet schools.  These schools would, supposedly as 
a result of a lottery that would include schoolchildren from both Hartford and its 
neighboring towns, be more racially diverse than the current Hartford public schools.  In 
order for this lottery to be effective, it would be necessary for high participation from 
suburban whites in the Interdistrict Magnet School program.  
It soon became clear that these voluntary programs, as they were, would not be 
sufficient in achieving ​Sheff’s​ lofty goals.  In March of 1998, two years after the ​Sheff 
ruling, only two of the Interdistrict magnet schools that had been created were enrolling 
Hartford students.  At the same time, only 496 students were participating in Open 
134 Jack Dougherty, Christina Ramsay, and Jesse Wanzer, "Sheff v. O'Neill: Weak Desegregation 
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Choice, the lowest number of students ever enrolled in the district transfer program.  In 
response to these shortcomings, the ​Sheff ​plaintiffs soon filed a motion in court for an 
order to create a solution that would be more effective.   Judge Julia Aurigemma ruled 135
in the state’s favor against this motion on March 3, 1999, stating that “the state’s 
response to the Supreme Court’s decision was swift.”    Judge Aurigemma claimed 136
that the state acted “expeditiously” and that the panel had created a “comprehensive, 
interrelated, well-funded set of programs and legislations designed to improve education 
for all children.”   Despite this ruling, the facts above showing the lack of progress in 137
the years after the 1996 decision show that the State did not act ‘expeditiously’ or in a 
‘comprehensive’ way.  Three years after the initial ruling, the State was submitting to 
resistance to effective desegregation methods such as redistricting and mandatory 
busing.  Regardless of the State failing to show meaningful progress yet still being 
protected by court rulings, the Court decided that Connecticut should be allowed more 
time to work on integration.  Judge Aurigemma’s decision was irresponsible, as it did 
not set definitive directives for the state to achieve the goal of integration, leaving room 
for the state to avoid acting in a way that would fully address the problem in a timely and 
complete manner. 
A year later, on December 28, 2000, the plaintiff's submitted a Motion to the court 
again to address the deficiencies in the voluntary school choice programs of Project 
Choice and the Interdistrict Magnet Schools that continued to fail to result in the swift 
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and effective integration of Hartford’s public schools.  In addition to the lack of 
mandatory compliance, neither Project Choice nor the magnet schools attempted to 
deal with the 1909 statute that had been deemed crucial to the maintenance of 
segregation in Hartford’s schools.  The plaintiffs called the Project Choice program 
“wholly inadequate to address the constitutional deficiencies set out in the 1996 Sheff 
ruling,” and claimed that the “Interdistrict Magnet School Program, although it provides a 
quality educational program to a relatively small number of students, has also been 
wholly inadequate to address” the same constitutional deficiencies.   138
The plaintiffs admitted that these magnet schools were doing some good work in 
their communities, but complained that these programs had been underfunded, and had 
not been expanded to reach a significant population, in part because it took individual 
responsibility of Hartford residents to enact the integration that was truly the 
responsibility of the state.  In fact, as they pointed out, less that 4 percent of 
schoolchildren in the city of Hartford were provided an integrated education through 
Project Choice, and less than 2 percent of Hartford schoolchildren were receiving an 
integrated education through the Interdistrict Magnet School Program.   The complaint 139
details issues with these programs such as the limited space in suburban schools that is 
set by those school districts themselves, the limited transportation and funding for these 
programs, and suburban districts’ ability to choose not to participate in these voluntary 
programs.   The numbers of students involved in these programs in 2000 show the 140
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deficiencies.  Only 752 children out of 23,000 in Hartford were permitted to participate in 
Project Choice.  Less than 400 of Hartford’s children were attending the other 
integration program, the Interdistrict Magnet Schools.  The 1999-2000 school year’s 
student population in Hartford’s public schools was not becoming an integrated group, 
but was becoming increasingly segregated, with a school population that was 95 
percent Black and Latino.  The Plaintiffs plead their case to the Superior Court, claiming 
that they had “brought this action in 1989 challenging the devastating effects of racial 
and ethnic segregation and isolation in Hartford area schools, and the deprivation of 
plaintiffs’ right to equal educational opportunity.  “More than eleven years later...these 
conditions continue unabated.”   The uncomfortable fact that Hartford’s schoolchildren 141
were still attending deeply-segregated schools after the ​Sheff​ decision highlights the 
failures of the State’s early desegregation plans that overburdened Hartford residents, 
and failed to address residential segregation and school quality in their solutions.  
On July 26, 2001, the Plaintiffs submitted a press release describing their 
position on the ​Sheff​ remedies five-years after the Supreme Court decision.  They 
detailed their request to the Court in hopes that further action would be taken in relation 
to their Motion from December 28, 2000.  “When we started this case,” began Elizabeth 
Sheff, “my son Milo was just a child.  Now so many, many, years later, Milo is raising his 
own child.  Obviously the promise of ​Sheff v. O’Neill ​ has passed by my son, but is my 
grandchild going to get the benefit?  The state is moving at a snail’s pace...We’re going 
back to court to demand that they give it [an equal educational opportunity] to us.” 
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Dennis Parker, of the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund signed onto the 
press release, writing that the plaintiffs had waited long enough for the State to provide 
an equal educational opportunity to all of its schoolchildren.  He claimed that “it has 
become clear to us that this legislature will never act on its own volition.  If ​Sheff v. 
O’Neill ​ is going to mean anything, it will be up to the Courts to enforce it.”  142
A year after the press conference, on April 16, 2002, the Sheff plaintiffs once 
again returned to the Superior Court, and attempted to bring about a court ordered 
solution that would force the state to enact effective integration policy.  On January 22, 
2003, the court reached a settlement that many hoped would be a promising step in 
moving forward with desegregation plans in Hartford.  What has become known as the 
Sheff I​ stipulation was the first settlement reached after the original 1996 opinion that 
attempted to address the shortcomings of the State since that decision.  The new ​Sheff 
I ​agreement was set to continue until June 30, 2007.  The settlement stated that the 
State would achieve the goals set forth by ​Sheff I ​if, by January 30, 2007, “at least 30 
percent of minority students residing in Hartford will have an educational experience 
with reduced isolation.”   In 2002, the year before the settlement, less than 10% of 143
Hartford’s schoolchildren were in such a setting.   The State would need to enforce 144
suburban participation in ​Sheff​ programs  if this goal was to be achieved by 2007.  In 
regards to the Interdistrict Magnet School Program, the State was ordered to “plan, 
develop, open, and operate two new host magnet schools of approximately 600 
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students each...each year of the four year period of the Stipulation.”   According to the 145
Stipulation, there would be a total of 22 Interdistrict Magnet Schools, many with specific 
focuses ranging from art to science to the classics, by the end of the agreement. 
Fourteen of these schools would be within the boundaries of the City of Hartford, and 
the rest in nearby suburbs with relatively large minority populations.  The settlement 
agreed that a magnet school would only meet the desegregation standard as a 
reduced-isolation setting if the proportion of minority students in the school by the 
2006-2007 school year did not exceed 74%.   For this program to work, the goal was 146
to attract white students to these schools, rather than disperse black and Hispanic 
students throughout the region.  In terms of the Open Choice program, the plan would 
be to expand it every year of the Stipulation until 2007 to reach a capacity that is “equal 
to the annual demand for seats, to a level of at least 1,000 seats in year one of this 
stipulation,” with the number of seats rising by at least 200 each year for “minority public 
school students residing in Hartford.  At the time of the ​Sheff I ​settlement, Project 
Choice had 900 student participants, mostly Hartford minority schoolchildren 
transferring into the suburban districts.   The Connecticut House of Representatives 147
voted 87-70 in favor of the settlement, and ​Sheff I ​became the newest formula for the 
State to address segregation.   148
 
 
145 SHEFF V. O’NEILL SETTLEMENT (Superior Court January 22, 2002). 
146 Jack Dougherty, Christina Ramsay, and Jesse Wanzer, "Sheff v. O'Neill: Weak Desegregation 
Remedies and Strong Disincentives in Connecticut, 1996-2008," ​Trinity College Digital Repository​, 2009. 
147 Ibid 
148 Ibid 
Bloom, 56 
Figure: Percent of Total Enrollment of Hartford-Minority students in ​Sheff​ Region 
Districts Through Project Choice in the 2006-2007 School Year 
 
 ​Hartford-Minority Student Participation in Project Choice by District Enrollment, 2006-2007 School 149
Year.  The ​Sheff I ​settlement called for at least 1,000 seats available through Project Choice by the first 
year of the Stipulation, and an increase in enrollment by 200 each year.  By the 2006-2007 school year, 
though, enrollment was just above 1,000, far off from the goal set in ​Sheff I 
149 Jack Dougherty et al., "A Visual Guide to Sheff v. O'Neill School Desegregation," ​Trinity College Digital 
Repository​, July 2006. 
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A year and a half after the ​Sheff I ​settlement, in August of 2004, the Plaintiffs 
were still not satisfied by the progress made by the State.  They submitted a Motion 
claiming that the State had failed to comply with the ​Sheff I ​settlement in the 18 months 
since the agreement.  While the agreement had ordered the creation of two new magnet 
schools of 600 students each for each of the four years of the Stipulation, no new 
magnet schools of 600 students were created in the first year of the agreement. 
Instead, two new magnets were formed out of already existing Hartford public schools, 
and these schools only held 450 and 82 students respectively, far short of the 1,200 
students that the two new schools were supposed to enroll.   Looking forward to the 150
2004-2005 school year that was about to begin, the plaintiffs complained that the 
Defendants projected opening three new magnet schools that year, but only with an 
estimated total of 330 students being enrolled.  “Thus, as of September 2004,” wrote the 
plaintiffs, “defendants were required by the Order to have 2,400 students attending new 
magnet schools.  They will have fewer than 900.”   The issue at hand remained a 151
stalemate between the plaintiffs and the state.  The agents of change who fought in 
court to find remedies to the problem posed by segregation in Hartford were locked in 
battle with the state’s efforts at resistance.  The solutions continued to put the burden of 
integration on Hartford schoolchildren without sufficiently dealing with the root causes of 
segregation.  This created inadequate remedies that were unable to meet the demands 
of integration that ​Sheff​ had hoped to achieve by this time.  
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As 2007 arrived, and the ​Sheff I ​settlement expired on June 30th, the Plaintiff's 
filed a new Motion on July 5th to request a court order to continue implementation of the 
Sheff​ ruling.  At the end of the four-year settlement that had hoped to achieve modest 
but noticeable goals of integration in Hartford’s public schools, “the racial composition of 
magnet schools varied widely...At one extreme, the Simpson-Waverly Classical 
Elementary Magnet School enrolled 95 percent minority students...At the other extreme, 
the Greater Hartford Academy of the Arts High School enrolled 26 percent minority 
students.”   Despite the intentions of those who had been involved in crafting the ​Sheff 152
I ​Stipulation, more than 40 percent of the minority students who were attending the 
Interdistrict Magnet Schools were from suburban school districts in the 2007-2008 
school year.  Most of the suburban children in general that were enrolling in magnets 
were minorities.  White suburban children were participating in the program in smaller 
numbers.   One of the issues with the ​Sheff I ​remedy that Jack Dougherty explains 153
was that “urban/suburban residence” was used “as a proxy for race.”   The problem 154
with this was that the heightened interest in the magnets from suburban minority 
students led to many of the magnet schools failing to meet the reduced-isolation 
standard that had been set in the stipulation.  Without a mandatory compliance directive 
for suburban residents or a redistricting scheme, white suburban enrollment in magnet 
schools would not reach a level that would integrate Hartford’s public schools. 
152 Jack Dougherty, Christina Ramsay, and Jesse Wanzer, "Sheff v. O'Neill: Weak Desegregation 
Remedies and Strong Disincentives in Connecticut, 1996-2008," ​Trinity College Digital Repository​, 2009. 
153 Ibid 
154 Ibid 
Bloom, 59 
Despite these shortcomings, the state of Connecticut continued to fund the 
magnet schools that failed to reach the stated integration standards, even when they 
enrolled over 75 percent or more minority students in their school populations.  The 
State’s inability to discipline schools that did not meet the goals of ​Sheff​ fed into the 
problem of lack of enforcement of voluntary programs that prevented integration from 
occurring fully and swiftly.  Leonard Stevens, who helped with the desegregation efforts 
for the ​Sheff​ plaintiffs during the trial, argued that “integration programs by definition 
depend on a two-way flow of students; otherwise, students of one racial group bear a 
disproportionate share of the burden of traveling to get to integrated schools.”   To 155
complicate this, when residency is used as a proxy for race, a numerically successful 
two-way flow doesn’t necessarily mean racially integrated schools.  By the time the 
plaintiffs filed their Motion in 2007 to push for further court assistance, the goal of 30% 
of Hartford's minority student population attending reduced-isolation schools had still not 
been met.  The plaintiff's calculated the actual percentage of Hartford minority 156
students that were enrolled in reduced-isolation settings at 9.3%, this was 0.7% worse 
than when the settlement was reached in 2002.  
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Figure: Amount of Hartford-Minority Students Counting to the 30% ​Sheff​ Goal and the 
Percentage Each Program Contributed to the Goal by School Year 
 
 Hartford-Minority Students in Public Schools and the Percent towards the 30% ​Sheff​ Goal the Student 157
Numbers Reached.  The ​Sheff​ Plaintiff's subtracted 7.7% from the 16.9% in 2006-07 based on their 
calculations of schools that were racially imbalanced but had been exempted, and found that there had 
actually been an increase in students enrolled in segregated schools since 2002-03. 
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In May of 2007 the plaintiffs and defendants began negotiations for a new 
settlement to replace the ​Sheff I ​agreement that was set to expire on June 30th, 2007. 
On April 4, 2008, a final settlement was reached that became known as ​Sheff II, ​and 
was signed into law by the House Education Committee and Senate Committee shortly 
after.  ​Sheff II​ was set to last until June 30, 2012, although language in the stipulation 
allowed for an extension throughout the 2013-2014 school year if need be.  The goals of 
the agreement were that, by year 5 of the stipulation, “at least 80% of the demand for a 
reduced-isolation setting is met.”   This demand-driven goal was a much different 158
tactic than trying solely to achieve percentages of students in integrated settings.  A 
demand driven goal was a move further in the direction away from comprehensive 
integration.  By focusing on a market-term such as demand, the responsibility for 
integration once again was put upon individual residents of Hartford and its suburbs to 
achieve integration in Hartford’s public schools.  In terms of reducing the student 
population in segregated educational settings, a goal was set for Hartford minority 
students in reduced-isolation settings to rise from 22 percent in 2008-2009, to 41 
percent in 2011-2012.  Benchmarks were set for ​Sheff II​ in the first year of the 
agreement, 19 percent of Hartford minority students would be in reduced-isolation 
settings, and in year two, 27 percent.  
As the June 30, 2012 ​Sheff II ​settlement drew to a close, the plaintiffs sought an 
extension that would push Phase II for an extended year until June 30, 2014.  The goals 
of this extension related to both the expansion of Magnet schools, as well as 
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modifications to the Open Choice program.  Despite the lack of meaningful integration 
by this time, no new initiatives were put forth in the newest stipulation to ensure 
suburban engagement in integration efforts or to deal with the barrier presented by 
residential segregation in the region.  The failure to address these issues with the 
previous solutions resulted in the inability of the settlement to fully deal with 
segregation.  The agreement laid out the foundation for the Connecticut State 
Department of Education to fund, plan, develop, and operate four new magnet schools, 
as well as one expanded magnet school.  Three schools that were currently Hartford 
neighborhood schools, Global Experience Magnet School, Wintonbury Each Childhood 
Magnet School, and Connecticut International Baccalaureate Academy, would all 
become Interdistrict magnet schools.  In addition to expanded physical buildings, the 
capacity for student populations was set to expand to “enroll Hartford resident students 
as estimated, which reflects the 2013-14 expanded capacity projections for 
Hartford-resident seats based on an 80 percent acceptance rate.”   For the Interdistrict 159
Magnet School program, the ​Sheff II ​extension was meant to expand both the maximum 
number of students that could be serviced, and to meet most of the demand for the 
programs.  The goal of meeting 80% demand from Hartford residents could never 
achieve meaningful integration.  As the majority of Hartford schoolchildren are black or 
Hispanic and the majority of suburban schoolchildren are white, a goal that only focuses 
on increasing Hartford enrollment without increasing suburban enrollment won’t achieve 
integration.    Once again, the burden to integrate was being avoided by suburban 
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school districts who feared a loss of local control.  To end the extension, and look 
forward to the future of Hartford’s desegregation plans, the agreement settled on a date 
for Phase III negotiations to begin on May 8, 2013, and for a new stipulation to be 
reached no later than October 1, 2013.  160
The ​Sheff III ​settlement, which was set to cover until June 30, 2015, was settled 
in court on December 13, 2013.  “The goal of this Stipulation is attainted,” read the 
Phase III agreement, “if the percentage of Hartford-resident minority students in a 
reduced-isolation educational setting...is equal to or greater than 44 percent” by June 
30, 2015   This was only a 3 percent increase from the goal set by the ​Sheff II 161
settlement.  In addition to this goal, the agreement sought to expand Open Choice by an 
additional 500 seats during the term of the ​Sheff III​ settlement.  Expansion of Open 
Choice engaged suburban districts in the integration process to an extent, but any 
realistic goal for achieving integration would need to be far more reaching in its 
requirements for suburban participation that this minimal goal.  
A few months before the end of ​Sheff III​, in February of 2015, an extension was 
made to the ​Sheff III ​agreement in court, in place of a Phase IV settlement.   The 162
stated purpose of the ​Sheff III ​extension was to be the reduction of “racial, ethnic, and 
economic isolation in the Hartford Public Schools for the 2015-16 school year until June 
30, 2016.”   The main changes to the goals from the original ​Sheff III​ agreement were 163
that the benchmark for percentage of Hartford-resident minority students in a 
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reduced-isolation setting was increased (by a small amount) to 47.5 percent from the 
original 44 percent.  In addition, the Open Choice program was again planned to be 
expanded by an additional 325 seats in the 2015-2016 school year.   This extension 164
did little to address any of the shortcomings that had impeded all of the previous efforts, 
and instead opted to carry on the same path. 
On May 30, 2017, the plaintiffs filed again in the Superior Court, this time 
challenging the state on their lack of efforts to integrate Hartford’s schools in the more 
than two decades that they had been fighting in court.  
“The plaintiffs move for an order further implementing the Supreme Court’s 
1996 mandate.  Since that time [1996], the parties have entered into a series 
of stipulations, in 2003, 2008, 2013, 2015, and 2016.  While progress has 
been made in desegregating the public schools in the Hartford metropolitan 
area since 1996, over half the students residing in Hartford still attend a public 
school that is racially and ethnically segregated.”   165
Despite all of the stipulations that had been meant to further integration in Hartford’s 
schools, segregated schooling was still the reality for many of Hartford’s schoolchildren. 
In addition, the plaintiffs wrote, “the demand by large numbers of students and their 
parents for a racially and ethnically integrated education remains unfilled.”   The 166
state’s failure to comply  was not for a lack of community interest in Hartford, but rather 
the absence of significant participation by suburban districts.  The plaintiffs asked the 
court to force the defendants to comply with the 2016 Stipulation, as well as extend it 
164 ​Ibid 
165 ​Ibid 
166 ​Ibid 
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further an additional six months until December 30, 2017.  Although they hoped to force 
the court to act, as long as voluntary programs were the standard, the state could not be 
forced into compliance. They wrote to the court that “allowing the [​Sheff III ​Second 
Extension] to expire on June 30, 2017 with no follow-up stipulation or court order would 
wreak havoc on the complex and wide-ranging regional educational desegregation 
system.”   167
As the two parties had entered multiple stipulations dating back to 2003, and as 
the latest stipulation was to expire on June 30, 2017, it was crucial to the plaintiffs that a 
new agreement be reached soon.  The plaintiffs wrote in their motion not only about the 
statistics of segregation standards, but made a plea as well, pointing to the damage that 
segregated learning spaces have on students.   This argument highlights why 168
integrated schooling is important.  Integration has significant impacts on the lives of 
America’s schoolchildren.  The plaintiffs wrote the following for the court: 
Racial and ethnic segregation has a pervasive and invidious impact on 
schools...[S]chools are an important socializing institution, imparting those 
shared values through which social order and stability are maintained. 
Schools bear central responsibility for inculcating [the] fundamental values 
necessary to the maintenance of a democratic political system...When 
children attend racially and ethnically isolated schools, these shared 
values are jeopardized: If children of different races and economic and 
social groups have no opportunity to know each other and to live together 
167 Ibid 
168 Plaintiffs’ Application For Temporary Injunction (Superior Court May 30, 2017). 
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in school, they cannot be expected to gain the understanding and mutual 
respect necessary for the cohesion of our society. [T]he elimination of 
racial isolation in the schools promotes the attainment of equal 
educational opportunity and is beneficial to all students, both black and 
white.   169
On August 7, 2017, the court found that of 21,362 total Hartford-resident minority 
students, 9,878 of these students attended reduced-isolation educational settings, and 
that 3,600 of these students remained on a waitlist for Interdistrict Magnet schools.  170
Despite the earlier goal to meet more demand for the integration programs in the ​Sheff 
region, the court showed that the majority of interested schoolchildren remained on 
waitlists by 2017, and most were students from Hartford itself.  “Further isolation,” wrote 
the court, “particularly, without any definite plan for the future constitutes irreparable 
harm for which there is no adequate remedy at law.  Furthermore, equity cannot favor 
more segregation, especially in light of the 1996 Supreme Court decision which directs 
a reduction in racial and ethnic isolation.”   Despite this declaration, effective 171
measures enforcing regional participation in integration were still not instituted by the 
court or any legislators. 
 The defendants submitted a motion in response, asking for clarification as to 
what their legal obligations were.  “It is now 28 years later,” the defendants begin, “and 
the legislative and executive branches of state government have enacted legislation, 
promulgated policies, and instituted programs…that have consumed almost $3 billion in 
169 Ibid 
170 Ibid 
171 Ibid 
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the development of, operation of, and transportation for scores of Interdistrict magnet 
schools and programs, and a voluntary busing plan.”  ​ ​The defendants stated to the 172
court that that they “now seek a legal ruling or rulings from this Court as to what the 
scope of [the state’s] obligations are with respect to its continuing efforts to comply with 
the Supreme Court mandate.”   Despite only instituting voluntary programs, never 173
addressing residential segregation in Hartford, failing to invest in making integrated 
schools high-quality, and rarely (if ever) achieving the goals set forth by the court, the 
state was hoping to bring this case to a close.  Ten days later, the plaintiffs filed a 
motion in opposition to the defendants, defending the efforts of ​Sheff​, and putting on the 
spot the failures of the state to fulfill its constitutional obligations.  “Twenty-two years 
after the landmark decision, over half of Hartford schoolchildren remain in segregated 
schools.  That percentage has increased over the past year.”   174
As the plaintiffs pointed out in 2018, most Hartford schoolchildren were being 
educated in segregated educational settings.  As a mandatory plan was never put into 
place, the state relied on voluntary action by the ​Sheff​ region community, suburbs and 
city alike, to create progress.  The solutions that were enacted never attempted to tackle 
the issue of residential segregation through effective redistricting schemes.  In addition, 
the state often failed to reach its own goals of building schools, enrolling specific 
numbers of students, and meeting the demand of the community.  Due to these 
shortcomings, Hartford public schools remain segregated in 2019.  The ​Sheff​ saga 
revealed that resistance exists within the state of Connecticut to promoting policies that 
172 Motion in Limine or For Clarification of the Scope of Hearing (Superior Court March 9, 2018). 
173 Motion in Limine or For Clarification of the Scope of Hearing (Superior Court March 9, 2018). 
174 Motion in Limine or For Clarification of the Scope of Hearing (Superior Court March 9, 2018). 
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would be effective in integrating schools, and the state’s constant defense in court of 
their lack of progress proves a lack of dedication to achieving the goals set forth by 
Sheff​.  As is now commonly recognized, separate does not, and cannot, mean equal. 
By this standard, the state of Connecticut has made equitable schooling available to 
some of Hartford’s students, but the rights of too many of these schoolchildren remain 
violated by the state’s failures to integrate Hartford public schools. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Bloom, 69 
Where We Stand: Unfulfilled Promises in 2019 
More than twenty years after the 1996 decision in ​Sheff v. O’Neill ​, the goal of this 
original ruling to unravel the unconstitutional segregation in Hartford’s public schools 
has not come been fully realized. While some progress has been made, which can be 
seen throughout the continuous ​Sheff​ settlements and the incremental change that 
occurred with each new phase, many of the goals in previous settlements were never 
attained, and these goals were often changed or pushed back.  One problem with the 
decision in 1996 was the lack of a specific solution or timeline for how integration could 
be achieved.  Despite the unconstitutionality of Hartford’s school segregation, the policy 
solutions remained loose and voluntarily as a result of public opinion that was opposed 
to mandatory integration.  In addition, while the original decision pointed to the 
districting statute that arranged Connecticut’s schools by residential districts, no efforts 
resulting from ​Sheff​ addressed the segregation in housing that led to the same problem 
in Hartford’s schools in the first place.  Any attempt to redraw district boundaries to 
achieve integration, a plan that would have been much more effective than the voluntary 
programs that ensued, would have faced massive backlash, much of this from the 
suburbs.  By failing to address the history of residential segregation in Hartford, ​Sheff 
solutions could only go so far without addressing the root cause of the problem.  A third 
shortcoming of the ​Sheff​ solutions was the fact that no goals were ever set in order to 
achieve quality schooling in addition to integration.  A good education should be 
integrated, but integration will not fulfill the goal of equitable education for all Hartford 
public school students if the schools are not of good quality.  Equitable education in 
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Hartford’s schools cannot be achieved without dismantling segregation with adherence 
to goals that address the underlying issues or without efforts to ensure the quality of all 
schools.  Unfortunately, this has not been the case in the more than twenty years since 
the original court order.  Despite prolonged efforts intended to integrate Hartford’s public 
schools, the influence of political pressure from the suburbs, the failure to address the 
influence of residential segregation in the ​Sheff ​region, and the lack of a directive to 
address the quality in the city’s schools have prevented the dream of ​Sheff​ from being 
fully realized in 2019.  
At the time that the ​Sheff​ complaint was filed in 1989, there was a significant 
degree of segregation in public schools in Hartford and its surrounding suburbs.  In 
1989, the initial ​Sheff​ complaint described the demographics of Hartford and its schools, 
claiming that, although blacks and Hispanics comprised only 20.6 percent of 
Connecticut’s school-age population, they made up 91 percent of Hartford’s school 
children.  Other areas around Hartford were used to highlight the depth of segregation 
in Hartford.  For example, while Hartford’s schools were 91 percent minority, West 
Hartford schools were only 15.7 percent minority, and Glastonbury schools were a mere 
5.4 percent minority.   In 1996, when the decision was made, there seemed to be 175
hope that solutions would be put in place to finally integrate Hartford’s students 
effectively.  Despite the fact that over twenty years have passed since the 1996 
decision, while some progress has been made, Hartford’s public schools and the 
schools in neighboring areas have not fully rid themselves of segregation.  In the 
175 Milo Sheff, et al., v. William O’Neill - Plaintiffs' Complaint (Hartford Superior Court April 26, 1989). 
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2015-2016 school year, the population of the city of Hartford was 15.9 percent white, 
38.3 percent black, and 43.6 percent Hispanic.  This is a stark difference between the 
surrounding school districts where the white population is 49 percent higher with a 
population that is 65 percent white.  The school district in Hartford reflects the overall 
population of the city, as 31.3 percent of Hartford students are black, and 49.9 percent 
are Hispanic, a student population that is 81.2 percent black and Hispanic, a decrease 
of 9.3 percent since 1989.   Of 47 total public schools in Hartford in the same school 176
year, 46.8 percent had a population of 90 percent or more black and Hispanic students, 
68 percent of schools had a population of 75 percent or more black and Hispanic 
students, and the school with the lowest minority population still had just over 53 
percent black and Hispanic students.   These statistics that were collected 20 years 177
after the ​Sheff​ decision highlight how the progress that has been made to integrate 
Hartford’s public schools ​post-Sheff​ have not resulted in a significantly integrated school 
system. 
Authors Roslyn Mickelson, Martha Bottia, and Stephanie Southworth describe 
the appeal of school choice programs to suburban parents and legislators.  They 
discuss how choice programs “appeal to parents and educators frustrated with the slow 
pace of school improvement in many low-performing urban schools, and to those whose 
ideologies maintain markets can provide more efficient education than the state.”  178
176 "Hartford Public Schools: Striving for Equity through Interdistrict Programs," The Century Foundation, 
October 14, 2016. 
177 Robert Cotto Jr, "Hartford Public Schools Enrollment, Race, and Accountability Data 2015-16," Cities 
Suburbs Schools Project at Trinity College, January 19, 2018. 
178 R.A. Mickelson and S. Southworth, "School Choice and Segregation by Race, Class, and 
Achievement," ​National Education Policy Center​, 2008. 
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Efforts to make schools resemble markets through the influence of suburban public 
opinion have resulted in voluntary choice desegregation programs that rely on 
individuals to make the decision to help integrate the schools in their region.  This has 
become the main solution, rather than a decisive order, which would impact the 
schooling of all suburban public school students.  Instead, efforts have relied on 
schoolchildren in Hartford and those in the suburbs who chose to participate.  Voluntary 
integration programs historically have had more support from the public and from 
elected officials than mandatory programs such as forced busing and the redrawing of 
district lines. Terry Cassidy, the executive director of the Connecticut Association of 
Boards of Education said in 1988 that “voluntary programs are...preferred by local 
schools boards.”   Connecticut State Attorney General Richard Blumenthal declared 179
after the ​Sheff​ decision that Connecticut would never enact a solution that “threatened 
local control,” solutions which Lauren Wetzler says “would have been political suicide 
for suburban legislators.”   The current policy solutions put the burden to integrate on 180
Hartford schoolchildren, leaving suburban children with the control to choose if they will 
even take part in the programs.  
A study described by Darryl McMiller shows survey data from Connecticut 
residents in the late 1990s detailing public opinion about desegregation methods at the 
time the ​Sheff ​solutions were being initially formulated into policies.  A rift between 
Connecticut’s white residents and residents of color appears in the survey data about  
179 Charlotte Libov, "Racial Report on Schools: The Fallout," ​The New York Times​, January 31, 1988. 
180 Lauren Wetzler, "Buying Equality: How School Finance Reform and Desegregation Came to Compete 
in Connecticut," ​Yale Law and Policy Review ​ 22 (2004):. 
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busing.  In 1996, 64 percent of whites were opposed to busing, while 51 percent of 
people of color were in favor of busing.  In contrast to widespread opposition amongst 
whites to integration programs that would have a significant impact on their children in 
the suburbs, Interdistrict Magnet Schools received more support, as they left open the 
option to participate or not.  62 percent of whites and 77 percent of people of color 
surveyed in 1999 said that they favored “the creation of regional schools...so-called 
magnet schools - in order to achieve integration.”   It is apparent from this data that the 181
influence of suburban whites on the policies produced after ​Sheff​ forced voluntary 
programs that benefited white children who were not obligated to take part in 
integration. 
Connecticut State Senator Thomas Gaffey spoke to the press during the hearing 
around the ​Sheff I ​stipulation in 2007, claiming that ‘The notion that we’re going to get a 
better result by voluntary programs is ridiculous.”   Senator Gaffey continued to go on 182
and say that “we need to shift away from the model of remedy that the State has been 
pursuing for years,” mainly suggesting that a move away from voluntary-only programs 
would be necessary to achieve the goals that the ​Sheff​ plaintiffs set out to achieve 
beginning in 1989, 18 years before these comments were made.   Dougherty, Wanzer, 183
and Ramsay write that “although every metropolitan desegregation plan faces logistical 
challenges, the absence of clear governance over the ​Sheff I ​remedy made these 
181 Darryl L. Mcmiller, "Public Opinion and School Desegregation in Hartford, Connecticut," ​Equity & 
Excellence in Education ​ 33, no. 2 (2000):. 
182 ​J​ack Dougherty, Christina Ramsay, and Jesse Wanzer, "Sheff v. O'Neill: Weak Desegregation 
Remedies and Strong Disincentives in Connecticut, 1996-2008," ​Trinity College Digital Repository​, 2009. 
183 Ibid 
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problems even worse in Connecticut.”   Cesar Batalla, of the Puerto Rican Coalition of 184
Bridgeport, while discussing the Tirozzi Report on segregation in Connecticut, warned 
of the issues voluntary programs would pose before ​Sheff​ had been brought to court. 
Batalla said “When you talk about magnet schools, you’re talking about a few selected 
kids.  It’s a good beginning, but, personally, I think that desegregation will only come 
about through the courts.”   A clear directive from either the courts or legislators that 185
would force suburban whites to participate in integration efforts would be the only way to 
integrate Hartford’s schools effectively, but resistance from the suburbs has impeded 
any such effort. 
Jesse Wanzer writes about the problems that are inherent to the voluntary choice 
centered Interdistrict Magnet Schools that have become the main avenue for integration 
efforts in the ​Sheff ​region.  Wanzer raises issues relating to the application process and 
the choice aspect of these schools.  Wanzer writes:  
Magnet schools in the area have no control over who applies, even with 
vigorous marketing techniques, due to the fact that parents voluntarily apply 
to magnet schools. At best, magnet school administrators can only hope to 
attract students of different backgrounds that help it meet the ​Sheff ​standards. 
The fact is that even though they had hoped to attract white suburban 
students, for the most part magnet schools have been more popular among 
Black and Hispanic suburban families; of all minority applicants to magnet 
schools, sixty percent come from Hartford while only 40% come from the 
184 ​Ibid 
185 Ibid  
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suburbs...Bringing these facts together, it is no surprise that the 30 percent 
goal was not met in June 2007.  186
Figure: Applications to Interdistrict Magnet Schools by Race and Suburban/City 
Residence
 ​The vast majority of students applying to magnet schools are minorities from Hartford.  For the most 187
part, very few applicants are white and from the suburbs 
 
 
186 Jesse Wanzer, Heather Moore, and Jack Dougherty, "Race and Magnet School Choice: A Mixed- 
Methods Neighborhood Study in Urban Connecticut," ​Trinity College Digital Repository​, March 28, 2008. 
187 Jack Dougherty et al., "A Visual Guide to Sheff v. O'Neill School Desegregation," ​Trinity College Digital 
Repository​, July 2006. 
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Figure: Enrollment in Magnet Schools Measured in all ​Sheff​ Districts by Number of 
Participants and Percentage of Population 
By far, the greatest number of students participating from any district is Hartford itself.  Bloomfield 188
has the highest participation rate, but has only 470 students enrolled in magnets compared to 3,310 
from Hartford.  All other districts besides East Hartford are below 10% participation, and most are 
below 4%.  
 
188 Ibid 
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Figure: Interdistrict Magnets in ​Sheff​ Region Percentage of Population of Minority 
Students in 2006-2007 School Year 
 ​The majority of magnets in the ​Sheff ​region remain segregated, many have 75-100% minority 189
populations, and only 4 schools have a percentage of minority students below 50%. 
 
189 Ibid 
Bloom, 78 
 
The inability to attract white families to participate in the voluntary ​Sheff​ programs 
has inhibited the integration of white students into the Interdistrict Magnet Schools. 
Without mandatory participation, white suburban students will likely continue to 
choose not to enter into these schools. 
With the knowledge of the history of residential segregation in Hartford that 
has been the leading contributor to segregation in Hartford’s schools, it is 
problematic that this context remains unaddressed throughout the ​Sheff ​case.   As 
the 1996 decision pointed to the districting statute as the main factor that contributed 
to the segregation in the city’s schools, any solution that would effectively integrate 
Hartford’s schools must address this.  One policy solution that would effectively 
integrate Hartford’s schools, and draw from the historical context of why the schools 
became segregated, is redrawing school district lines in the ​Sheff​ region.  The 
survey described by Darryl McMiller addresses public opinions on redistricting, 
which highlights why this method was never considered.  In 1996, despite the fact 
that 65 percent of people of color in Connecticut favored redrawing district lines, 57 
percent of whites opposed this solution.   In another section of the survey, 83 190
percent of residents surveyed in 1996 indicated that they valued “keeping children in 
the same town they live in” while formulating plans for desegregation.  Despite the 191
widespread support for localized schooling, a rift appears between black and white 
residents. McMiller observes that 65 percent of whites responded that they valued 
190 Darryl L. Mcmiller, "Public Opinion and School Desegregation in Hartford, Connecticut," ​Equity & 
Excellence in Education ​ 33, no. 2 (2000):. 
191 Ibid 
Bloom, 79 
this localization with the answer “very positive,” while people of color answered the 
same 49 percent of the time.   192
State leaders and legislators stood with the white suburban communities in 
the ​Sheff​ region when creating solutions, effectively abandoning any solutions that 
would address the factor that the court had deemed most influential in Hartford’s 
public school segregation.   When Governor Rowland established the Educational 
Improvement Panel, he immediately limited the scope of remedies the panel could 
approve by demanding solutions “based on voluntary measures emphasizing local 
and parental decision-making.”   The Education Improvement Panel, in response to 193
this directive, explicitly stated that it would “reject...redistricting” as a possibility for 
achieving integration.   Redistricting would hinder the ability of higher 194
socioeconomic status families to be able to purchase a home in a school district that 
was controlled solely by their suburb.  While this would begin to address the 
residential segregation that creates segregation in Hartford’s schools, suburban 
whites’ opposition stood in the way of effective reform. 
Authors Harrelson, Maloney, Murphy, Smith, and Dougherty point to the 
issues with voluntary school choice integration efforts in the context of 
understanding housing as a factor that influences school segregation.  They write 
“Many of these choice programs are politically justified on the logic that 
lower-income urban families deserve the same degree of school choice that 
192 Ibid 
193 Lauren Wetzler, "Buying Equality: How School Finance Reform and Desegregation Came to Compete 
in Connecticut," ​Yale Law and Policy Review ​ 22 (2004):. 
194 Ibid 
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middle-class home buyers currently enjoy through the suburban housing market.”  195
Despite the idea that expanding access to low-income families to better schooling 
options sounds like a positive move, it does not address the foundational problem 
that lies at the center of this issue.  Middle-class and high-income families have the 
option to move to the suburbs to send their children to the schools that they choose. 
A Hartford newspaper journalist wrote about this underlying issue of access to 
school choice opportunities, factually stating that “of course, if you have the money, 
Connecticut has ‘school choice.’  it’s called a suburb.”   Families who do not have 196
the wealth to pick up and move to the suburbs where they would be guaranteed 
attendance at the school in the suburb they chose are forced to rely on a lottery 
system that limits the number of students and families that can be serviced by 
school choice options.  Efforts to integrate by expanding access to Interdistrict 
Magnet Schools have been hindered as a result of white suburban families’ low 
rates of participation, a problem that cannot be solved without mandating suburban 
participation. 
Another significant shortcoming of ​Sheff​ is the lack of any mention of school 
quality in the decision or any of the stipulations.  Referring back to the landmark national 
desegregation case, ​Brown v. Board of Education​, Gloria Ladson-Billings writes that 
“there is no provision in ​Brown ​for equality of outcomes.  As long as blacks and other 
children of color were given the opportunity to attend the same schools that whites did, 
195 Jeffrey Harrelson et al., "School Choice in Suburbia: Test Scores, Race, and Housing Markets," 
Papers and Publications​, September 1, 2009. 
196
 ​Ibid 
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the state had met its legal and civic obligations.”   This same principle was embedded 197
in the ​Sheff​ programs, as the solutions focused solely on integration, with no 
benchmarks or goals to assure the integrated schools were of good quality. 
Perceptions amongst whites in Connecticut about the effect of integration on white 
students explains why many suburban whites have dismissed the idea that integrated 
schools could be of the same quality as their current suburban district schools.  In 1996, 
only 19 percent of Connecticut residents surveyed claimed that they believed integration 
“improved the quality of education for whites,” with more whites believing this than 
people of color.   The perception that integrated schooling would not be beneficial to 198
white students had much influence on the ​Sheff​ solutions, largely due to public opinion 
on the value of quality schools.  92 percent of those surveyed rated “small classes with 
more individual attention from teachers” positively, and 91 percent said the same for 
“programs in special areas like computers, the arts, or for gifted and talented students.”
  199
The public does not believe integration and quality go together.  Due to the 
resulting political pressure, efforts to emphasize promoting school quality in integrated 
schools were dismissed.  White suburban families will more likely be convinced to 
actively participate in integration efforts if these efforts produced schools that were 
higher quality than the ones in their suburban districts.  The most effective way to 
integrate Hartford’s public schools would require both mandating integration, while also 
197 Gloria Ladson-Billings, "Landing on the Wrong Note: The Price We Paid for Brown," ​Educational 
Researcher ​ 33, no. 7 (2004):. 
198 Darryl L. Mcmiller, "Public Opinion and School Desegregation in Hartford, Connecticut," ​Equity & 
Excellence in Education ​ 33, no. 2 (2000):. 
199 Ibid 
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making an investment in the resources and funding needed to promote quality schools 
that would attract more white suburban students.  Not only is school quality important as 
a recruiting mechanism, but an education should only be considered equitable if it is 
integrated as well as high-quality.  Policy makers’ history of bending to public pressure 
against integration efforts that force suburban children to participate, and that are 
perceived as harming the quality of suburban students, has resulted in the failure of the 
Sheff​ case to result in an equitable education for all of Connecticut’s Public School 
students.  
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Conclusion: Only Time Will Tell 
In 1989, when the ​Sheff​ plaintiffs had only just filed a judicial complaint over 
school segregation, there could have been no way of knowing the intense saga that 
would carry on for three decades without a resolution.  ​Milo Sheff et. al., v. William A. 
O’Neill et. al. ​holds a significant place in the history of American public school 
desegregation as the catalyst for one city’s extensive experimental efforts to reimagine 
the age-old idea that where you live is where you learn.  While the 1996 decision was 
an important first step, a single court ruling proved insufficient in dismantling a centuries 
old system of oppression.  Despite subsequent rulings, many goals remain unmet, 
benchmarks sit unreached, and the state has never decisively enforced the stipulations 
that succeeded the ​Sheff​ decision.  While some progress has been made, many of 
Hartford’s public schoolchildren remain in segregated learning environments.  The types 
of programs that were introduced after ​Sheff​ could never have been enough to address 
the underlying issues and logistical problems posed by Hartford’s segregation.  In 2019, 
the remaining pages of the ​Sheff v. O’Neill ​story remain unwritten. 
Voluntary integration efforts have impeded the ability to successfully achieve 
racial integration, in large part as a result of public opinion against mandatory programs. 
Anxiety amongst whites in the suburbs about the effect that integration would have on 
their own children and their control over their local schools highlighted public attitudes 
that influenced the conditions under which the ​Sheff​ solutions were formulated.  The 
policy resulting from ​Sheff​ focused solely on the school choice Interdistrict Magnet 
Schools and Open Choice programs.  These programs have transformed the landscape 
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of public education in the city of Hartford, but the new system has produced public 
schools that are only slightly less segregated than the schools before these programs 
were instituted.  These market-oriented programs were designed so that suburban 
parents and legislators could feel their own kids would not be affected, and were the 
result of the political pressure on legislators to put the burden of integration on residents 
of Hartford. 
Dating back throughout the history of Hartford, state efforts to segregate 
neighborhoods through housing discrimination maintained and enforced a divide 
between Hartford’s white and minority citizens.  The structures that built this system 
were never fully dismantled, and the legacy of these institutions continue to loom over 
the city today.  This case teaches us that the reality of residential segregation, and its 
role in segregating schools, must be addressed in any effort to desegregate that can 
hope to be effective, such as redrawing school district boundaries.  The Sheff remedies 
relied too heavily on public opinion to formulate programs rather than relying on 
historical knowledge of the cause of Hartford’s segregated public schools.  While 
redistricting would be an effective measure to combat the influence of residential 
segregation on segregation in public schools, white suburban families expressed 
resistance to any program that would impede their ability to have completely localized 
control of the suburban school districts they purchase homes in.  For future efforts to be 
successful, policy must be crafted within the context of this argument. 
The goal of Sheff was to integrate Hartford’s public schools, but efforts to 
address issues of school quality in integrated schools were not included in the goals set 
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forth by the Sheff solutions. ​ ​An equitable education for children is not only an integrated 
one, but one of a high-quality as well.  White suburban perceptions that integrated 
schools are inherently of lower quality than their own suburban schools have prevented 
the necessary resources from being directed to magnet schools to make them 
competitive with the suburban district schools. ​ ​Without setting goals to make sure the 
quality of the integrated schools were sufficient, ​Sheff​ failed to create a complete 
solution to the needs of Hartford’s public schoolchildren.  Integration is not sufficient 
enough to provide students with an equitable education.  Directives that put forth 
resources to meet high benchmarks of school quality in addition to standards of 
integration are needed to provide a truly equitable education.  
 While state and city officials continue to argue with the court about their efforts 
and obligations to desegregate Hartford’s schools, more and more generations of 
Hartford schoolchildren have been, and will continue to be, educated in segregated 
spaces.  A lack of participation and political pressure from white suburban families 
against methods of integration in the ​Sheff​ region that would place any burden to 
integrate on suburban districts have limited the effectiveness of introducing white 
students into integration programs.  Fear of the loss of local control of suburban 
schools, and the strong opposition amongst suburban whites to redistricting as a result, 
has led to a failure to address the root cause of school segregation in any efforts 
following ​Sheff​.  A perception that integration means lower quality schooling for white 
students has stood as a roadblock to putting effort into ensuring high quality in 
integrated schools, rather than solely focusing on integration.  Only time will tell where 
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the ​Sheff​ saga will take Hartford’s schoolchildren in the future. For now, the dream of 
integrated schooling in the city remains ahead, waiting to be fulfilled in the name of all 
Hartford children who have watched from within their segregated schools as the 
opportunity for integration passed many of them by. 
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